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Editors’ Note: We have included this paper in the ConWEB series, even though it is much 
longer than the work we normally present, because we believe it makes a valuable contribution 
to our understanding of issues of constitutionalism and governance beyond the state, and in 
particular the law/politics interface. Yoichiro Usui is preparing a shorter version of the paper 
within the framework of the UACES Study Group on Constitutionalism and Governance 
beyond the State, which will be published in due course [AW & JS] 
 
ABSTRACT 
Will the next generation experience the same quality of natural environmental beauty as that of former 
generations?  Environmental protection is one of the most serious tasks to be dealt with in the days and 
years ahead, and in tackling this issue, the question of how environmental norms evolve is an essential 
topic for consideration. With regard to the above, the EC has demonstrated a number of interesting 
institutional practices. This paper illuminates a role of law in the EC institutional practices, which have 
brought about the evolution of environmental norms. This role is argued in terms of the discursive power 
of law. In order to elucidate this discursive viewpoint, this paper offers a conceptual framework as 
follows: 1) Law catalyses normative discourse during the process of the creation, application and 
interpretation of norms. Laws in and of themselves are also normative discourses; 2) The concept of 
governance frames is referred to as the shared meanings of core norms, key concepts and regulative 
principles in a specific issue-area; 3) The accumulation of discourses around and of laws (re)creates a 
frame, and these discourses are contextualised within the preceding frames. This interaction causes norms 
to evolve; Lastly, 4) the concept of regime is referred to, and the institutional setting that supports 
normative discourses and frames is described. Regimes are defined as institutional complexes which 
procedurally reproduce normative discourse and substantively establish a policy agenda upon which a 
frame is built. In this way, this paper understands the development of EC environmental law as an 
example of norm evolution in a regime, in which the interaction of normative discourses and governance 
frames occurs. Building on this conceptual framework, this paper describes the norm evolution in EC 
environmental law. Before the legal base for environmental secondary legislation was provided by the 
SEA in 1987, the institutional practices of the EC had already led to: the ECJ judgments concerning 
environmental matters; legislation orientated towards environmental protection; and international 
environmental conventions to which the EC is party. On the basis of normative discourses around and of 
these laws, a governance frame has been transformed from a market supporting frame into a holistic and 
ecosystem-oriented frame. This paper thus illuminates a role of law in EC institutional practices which 
                                                 
1   A version of this paper was submitted to the University of Leeds as an MA thesis, supervised by 
Jo Shaw and Jo Hunt. Many thanks also to Anthea Connolly for diligent editorial support and 
valuable comments, and to Kenneth Armstrong (External Examiner) and to Juliet Lodge 
(Internal Examiner) for their stimulating and insightful criticisms. They have inspired me to 
make a number of changes to the thesis, as submitted, but the greater benefit of their critique will 
be to inform my future work. A special note of gratitude goes to the Belfast IR/EI colloquium, 
which has also stimulated me to take a greater interest in social constructivism. All responsibility 
for any remaining errors lies with the author. Finally, acknowledgement is due to Niigata 
University of International and Information Studies for giving me six months research leave and 
financial support. 
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have brought about the evolution of environmental norms, from the viewpoint of discursive power of law 
in issue-framing.  
 
Introduction 
It was the Single European Act (hereinafter SEA) in 1987 that formed the legal base for 
EC environmental legislation. At that time, Article 174 EC provided three main objectives: ‘to 
preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment; to contribute towards protecting 
human health; to ensure a prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources.’
2 At least insofar 
as the setting of this legal base for enacting secondary legislation is regarded as the birth of EC 
environmental law, it may be said that there was no environmental law before the SEA and it 
was after the SEA that environmental protection became one of the fields of EC law.  
However, secondary legislation clearly orientated to environmental protection had since 
the 1970s been enacted, along with three Community environmental action programmes 
(hereinafter EAP), international environmental agreements had been concluded by the 
Community and environmental matters had been brought before the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ECJ). Despite the economic orientation of the building of the common market in the 
early stages of European integration, EC environmental law had, therefore, been developed in 
the area of secondary legislation, international agreements and case law. In this regard, it can be 
said that the environmental acquis was gradually created through legal practices even before a 
clear legal base was established in primary legislation. Nowadays environmental protection is 
one of the main fields of EC law established in Articles 174, 175, 176 EC, on the basis of 
Article 6 EC which provides the principle of environmental integration for realising sustainable 
development.  
The solving of environmental problem is now one of most urgent tasks facing both 
contemporary society and future generations. In Europe, environmental issues in general have 
come to be taken more seriously,
3  and climate change in particular requires attention.
4   Of 
course, the proliferation of legislation and case law does not by themselves lead to the 
alleviation of environmental deterioration. However, it is guaranteed that effective 
environmental problem-solving cannot take place without shared environmental norms and the 
evolution of these norms. This paper insists that EC environmental law is a noteworthy example 
of norm evolution. While the institutional setting of the EC is orientated towards the building of 
the common market, its day-to-day institutional practices have brought about environmental 
norms, which inevitably constrain economic concerns. Therefore, the experience of the EC is an 
                                                 
2   In the treaty reform in Maastricht, a clause for the promotion of international environmental 
cooperation was added to this Article.    
3   The Global Assessment of the European Community Programme of Policy and Action, COM 
(99) 543. 
4   Environment 2010: Our future, Our choice, COM(2001)31 final. 
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interesting research theme in exemplifying the endogenous logic of institutional complexes. 
This paper aims to illuminate one dimension of roles of law in this institutional practices, which 
have brought about the evolution of environmental norms. 
In order to approach this theme, two sub-questions are addressed in this paper: what does 
the development of EC environmental law means; and how is EC environmental law developed? 
These two sub-questions are argued in terms of the discursive power of law
5 in issue-framing. 
Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to directly answer why the law has in the way 
that it has done developed. The paper focuses on institutional practices, but this focus should not 
lead to the conclusion that an institutional setting is the only and absolute cause of the 
development of law. Needless to say, it is not enough to focus on institutional practices in order 
to answer the third question of why law develops in a particular manner. To answer that 
question, other factors outside the institutional context should be considered. Nevertheless, both 
the first question and the second question shed light upon the main question of what a role of 
law in the institutional practices is.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: Chapter 1 presents a conceptual framework for 
considering what the development of EC environmental law means and tracing its 
developmental process, by making reference to the concepts of discourse, frame and regime; 
Chapter 2 examines the institutional setting of the EC in which EC environmental law is 
developed; Chapter 3 traces out the developmental process of EC environmental law on the 
basis of what the previous chapters argue. It is the intention of this paper to illuminate the 
institutional practices that have enabled EC environmental law to become a prominent 
illustration of norm evolution, and to address the fundamental question of what a role of law is 
in the institutional practices that have brought about the evolution of environmental norms, from 
the viewpoint of discursive power of law in issue-framing. 
 
1     Conceptual Framework 
This chapter offers a conceptual framework for considering the development of EC 
environmental law. On the one hand, this framework defines what this development means, on 
the other, it outlines how EC environmental law is developed through the institutional practices 
of the EC. EC environmental law is not regarded as a mere competent relationship between the 
Member States and the EC; rather, it is emphasised that the law represents shared environmental 
                                                 
5   For the discursive viewpoint of law see the following two studies based on the arguments of 
Foucault. A. Hunt and G. Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as 
Governance (Pluto Press, 1994); C. Muller-Hoff, ‘Representations of Refugee Women: Legal 
Discourse in Europe’ (2001) Law, Social Justice & Global Development (LGD) 2001(1) 
<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/issue/2001-1/mullerhoff1.html>. While this paper is inspired by 
these Foucaultdian perspectives of discourse, the main concern is a normative viewpoint of 
social constructivism concerning discourse, as will be discussed below. 
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norms on the basis of which the EC establishes a collective cognition concerning environmental 
issues in general. In other words, the development of EC environmental law is regarded as norm 
evolution in the process of which the common meanings of core norms, key concepts and 
regulative principles, which constitute a governance frame for environmental issue-areas, are 
constructed. In this conceptual framework, norm evolution is assumed to occur through 
discourses and to come into being as a frame; the latter is seen to create the context of the 
former, and one of the aims of this paper is to examine the institutional practices concerning this 
interaction between discourses and frames. Here, law is understood in terms of its discursive 
power. That is, law is seen as catalysing normative discourses, but at the same time laws are 
nevertheless regarded as normative discourses. The institutional setting that enables discourses 
and frames to interact is conceptualised as regimes. Regimes procedurally reproduce discourses 
and substantively establish a policy agenda on the basis of which EC environmental governance 





Discourse Norm Evolution Framing
(procedural terms) (substantive terms)
Regime
 
1.1   Discourse 
The social world is commonly experienced on the basis of shared meanings of the 
concepts which constitute the world. It is an accumulation of the unviewable and the endless 
discursive practices of countless individuals that creates, modifies and/or makes more precise 
the web of such meanings. As such, this discourse can be seen as being inescapably penetrated 
with an extant system of common meanings. However, since this system of meanings are 
socially constructed through intersubjective struggles or collaborations between countless 
individuals, their discursive practices transforms the extant system of common meanings. To put 
this another way, the social world is not formed from absolutely objective materials which exist 
irrespective of the observer. The world, that is, the research object in social sciences, consists of 
a web of meanings that can be recreated through discursive practices, and discourse can 
consequently be regarded as (re)creating the common meanings which constitute the social 
world.
 6  
  4
                                                 
6    For the constitutive role of discourse for creating a social world and how it binds agents  
With regard to the role of discursive weaving of intersubjective meanings, Diez explains as 
follows: 
‘The context about concepts is . . . not only between individuals and groups defending 
one meaning against another, but also between different ways of constructing ‘the 
world’ through different sets of languages. These different languages are not employed 
by actors in a sovereign way. It is the discursive web surrounding each articulation that 
makes the latter possible, on the one hand (otherwise, it would be meaningless), while 
the web itself, on the other hand, relies on its reproduction through these articulations.’
7  
Diez offers the concept of a ‘discursive nodal point’ to describe the interconnectedness of 
discourses. This point is beyond the control of any individual. All perceptions are the objects of 
particular discourses that are bound up with other discourses, and all individuals can participate 
in discursive practices, but none of them can control what system of meanings discourses weave 
as a whole. Individual discourses within ‘web’ are ‘held together by nodal points’.
8 Further to 
this, institutions ‘cannot be separated from the discourses they are embedded in’.
9 What should 
be taken into consideration when institutions change, is ‘a change in the discursive construction 
of these institutions’.
10  
It seems that Diez’s viewpoint can be taken to suggest an affinity between discourse 
analysis and legal interpretation. Law is certainly seen as a distinct and closed discourse 
available only to the lawyer, however, this discourse can be said, despite its exclusivity, to be 
simultaneously open to a wider context sociologically. With regard to this, the argument of 
Cotterrell should be borne in mind. Criticising Dworkin’s view on the exclusivity of legal 
discourse, Cotterrell suggests that the closed system of legal discourse, or a normative 
discursive unity, should be examined in terms of its sociological conditions.
11 In this sense, the 
potential of law to create shared meanings must be considered in terms of its discursive power. 
Building on these viewpoints, it appears that law can be conceptualised by reference to the 
concept of discourse. On the one hand, law can be regarded as being developed through 
discourses for the creation, application and interpretation of norms and instruments. This 
normative discourses in legislature, execution and judiciary are constrained by the previous 
legislation and case law and also by social (or pre-legal) norms. In these discursive spheres, law 
establishes the obligations of Member States and the competent relationship between Member 
                                                                                                                                               
structurally, see Hunt and Wickham, based on Foucault. A. Hunt and G. Wickham, above n.5, at 
7-9. 
7   T. Diez, ‘Speaking ‘Europe’: the politics of integration discourse’ (1999) 6 Journal of European 
Public Policy 598, at 603. 
8   Ibid., at 608. 
9   Ibid., at 610. 
10   Ibid.. 
11   For an argument on legal discursive closure, see R. Cotterrell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory 
in Sociological Perspective (Clarendon Press, 1995), at 91-110. 
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States and the EC. On the other hand, the legal texts of individual laws (legislation and case 
laws) themselves can also be regarded as discourses contributing to weaving the shared 
meanings, which constitute our world, in the sense that law is the outcome of collective 
decisions in a community. The former discourse (for norm creation, application and 
interpretation) can be called the normative discourse around law, and the latter (legal texts of 
individual laws) the normative discourse of laws. 
These forms of discourse can further be divided into the political and the legal. Needless 
to say, the adjective ‘political’ has very wide connotations, and its meaning can even be said to 
depend on individual writers. In this paper, political discourse is defined as primarily and 
mainly orientated towards policy goal-setting; legal discourse is defined as orientated towards 
norm-interpretation for the identification of legal obligation and its nonfulfillment. Here a 
political discourse may be a disguised norm orientation for pursuing power or interest 
maximisation. However, such a political discourse may also be constrained by social norms or 
legal norms.  
This understanding can be put into the context of the distinction between soft and hard 
law. Political discourses can be understood as those forms of written or verbal communication 
which cannot be the subject of judicial review
12 and therefore may be hortatory declarations or 
soft law. However, as the degree of obligation and precision expressed by the document or 
wording is increased,
13 political discourse advances closer to legal discourse. For instance, the 
principle of subsidiarity may have different meanings subject to the type of discourse in which it 
appears. In political discourses, subsidiarity is argued to be the principle enabling the 
empowerment of local communities, the promotion of transnational local networks, the 
retaining of competence by a Member State or the federalisation of the EU. In legal discourses, 
subsidiarity is the principle used for judging the validity of EC legislation or common action 
formation at the EU level in terms of competence misuse.
14  
Furthermore, intermediate discourses can be assumed at the intersection of political and 
legal discourses. Primary and secondary legislation and international agreements fall into this 
category and in the context of EC environmental law, Articles 6, 174, 175, 176 EC, 
                                                 
12    On this point Scott’s argument is instructive. See J. Scott, ‘Shared responsibility and the 
Community’s Structural Funds: a legal perspective’, in U. Collier et al. (eds) Subsidiarity and 
Shared Responsibility: New Challenges for EU Environmental Policy (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997). She draws a clear line between law and policy, by introducing ‘the 
concept of "justiciability", namely the susceptibility of the measure in question to application by 
a court of law’ (at 156). For example, depending on the susceptibility, it can be judged whether a 
concept, for example subsidiarity, is ‘a legal norm’ or ‘socio-philosophical principle’ (at 157). 
13   For the concept of obligation and precision in this gradation, see K. W. Abbott, et al., ‘The 
Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401. 
14   For example, see Opinion of Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council and 
Case C-74/99 R v. Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd and 
Others, June 15 2000, paras. 141 and 142. 
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environmental regulations or directives and international environmental conventions can be 
termed intermediate discourses. In the sphere of legal discourses, these legal texts present the 
judicially reviewable obligations of Member States, a connection with other legal norms or 
legislation, and the constitutional traditions of Member States or international legal norms. In 
the sphere of political discourses, these texts manifest collective recognition of public problems, 
policy goals and some hortatory principles. Thus, political discourses and legal discourses can 
be seen to be woven into legislation. 
Subsequently, six types of discourses can be assumed as shown in Diagram 2. ‘A’ 
is the political discourse around law; ‘F’ is the legal discourse of laws; ‘B’ and ‘E’ are 
the intermediate discourses around law and of law respectively. As will be argued in 
Chapter 3, EC environmental law can be interpreted as developing mainly through F 
(the legal discourse of laws) and E (the intermediate discourse of laws) supported by the 
other types of discourses. Diagram 3 shows an example of the putting into picture of this 
systematisation in the context of the EU’s official documents. Although there are ambiguous or 
unclear borders in the above categorisation, it nevertheless seems to be helpful for 
understanding the discursive sphere as institutionalised in the EU. 
Diagram 2 
Political Discourse Legal Discourse
Discourse around Law A B C
Discourse of Laws D E F
Diagram 3 
EAPs Reasoned opinion
Council Declaration Opinion of Advocate General
European Council Conclusion
Common Position of the
Council
Article 37 of EU Charter of
Fundamental and Human Rights

















As an instance of the political discourse around law (A in Diagram 2), the wording of the 
1990 European Council Declaration can be referred to: 
‘Mankind is the trustee of the natural environment and has the duty to ensure its 
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enlightened stewardship for the benefit of this and future generations. Solidarity must 
be shown with the poorer and less developed nations.’
15 
In contrast, the wording of the case law of the ECJ is an example of the legal discourse of laws 
(F in Diagram 2). It says: 
‘[I]t should be observed that the principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in 
absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the objectives of general 
interest (the protection of the environment in this case – inserted) pursued by the 
Community.’
16 
It should be noted that a concept can be found in different discourses which transmute into 
various documents holding differing status. This means that a concept can be placed in different 
discursive spheres defined according to their institutional context and as a result of which 
different documents hold different statuses. Put into different discursive spheres, a concept 
changes with regard to an aim and function. For instance, the principle of environmental 
integration can be found both in Article 6 EC after Amsterdam and in the 1972 EAP before the 
SEA. The former says:  
‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.’ 
The latter is says: 
‘Effects on the environment should be taken into account at the earliest possible stage in 
all the technical planning and decision-making processes’.
17 
While the former is an intermediate discourse of laws (E in Diagram 2) in the sense that it 
identifies the obligations of the EC, the latter is a political discourse around law (A in Diagram 
2), in aiming to introduce a new common policy strategy. 
It seems, however, necessary to give some explanation for B and C in Diagram 2. The 
discursive arrangement in the diagram pays attention to the pre-litigation procedure as the 
discursive sphere providing the intermediate and the legal discourse around law. In this respect, 
Case C-365/97 Commission v. Italy
18 serves as a reference. The Court stated that: 
‘the proper conduct of the pre-litigation procedure constitutes an essential guarantee 
required by the Treaty not only in order to protect the rights of the Member State 
concerned, but also to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined 
                                                 
15   Declaration by the European Council on the environmental imperative, Dublin, 25 and 26 June, 
Bull. EC 6-1990, Annex II, point 1.36, at para.20. 
16   Case  240/83,  Procureur de la Republique v. Association de defense des bruleurs d’huiles 
usagees (ADBHU) [1985] ECR 531, at 549, para.12. 
17   Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, OJ 1973 C112/3, at 6. 
18   Case C-365/97, Commission v. Italy [1999] ECR I-1773. 
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dispute as its subject-matter.’
19 
According to this viewpoint, it may be said that the pre-litigation procedure is the institution for 
catalysing the normative discourse around law. This procedure obliges the Commission to issue 
a formal notice letter and a reasoned opinion.
20 In this case, against the claim of the Italian 
government that the Commission did not provide a precise and clear formal notice letter, the 
Court argued that the purpose of the letter is to ‘delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, so that 
it cannot thereafter be extended’, and accordingly that the letter ‘cannot be subject to such strict 
requirements of precision’.
21 In contrast, the reasoned opinion provided in Article 226 EC ‘must 
contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons’
22 for concluding that a state failed to 
fulfill its obligations. Thus, the formal notice letter may fall into the category of intermediate 
discourse around law; the reasoned opinion may be regarded as the legal discourse around law, 
in terms of precision for identifying the nonfulfillment of obligations. In addition, the political 
strategy of the Commission at the stage of the formal notice letter may not be denied and this 
letter cannot, therefore, be said to present the legal discourse around law in a precise sense. 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to grasp the evolution of environmental norms in the EC by 
examining these forms of discourses. As will be argued below, the intermediate and the legal 
discourse of laws (E and F in Diagram 2) must be taken into account in order to trace this 
evolution. In any event, taking this point of view means that legal practices are put into a 
theoretical context of discourse that is assumed to (re)create the shared meanings comprising the 
social world. For the purpose of approaching an understanding of norm evolution in the 
environmental issue-area, the shared meanings must be specified in terms of environmental 
governance. 
1.2   Framing 
As noted above, the social world can be jointly experienced through the formation of 
shared meanings of fundamental concepts. Shared meanings enable the social world to emerge 
as an objective (or more precisely, intersubjective) world, and this general view can be applied 
to considering how a specific issue-area emerges into collective recognition. As a coherent 
system of shared meanings which establishes governance in a specific issue-area, it is the 
frame
23 which enables this. Public problem-solving is conditional on the formation of a frame to 
recognise a situation as problematic and as such, a frame differentiates one issue-area from 
                                                 
19   Ibid., para.35. 
20   For the pre-litigation procedure, see Section 2.1 in Chapter 2. 
21   Case C-365/97, para.23 and 26. 
22   Ibid., para.26. 
23   For the concept of the frame, see Y. Surel, ‘The role of cognitive and normative frames in 
policy-making’ (2000) 7 Journal of European Public Policy 495 and B. Kohler-Koch, ‘Framing: 
the bottleneck of constructing legitimate institutions’ (2000) 7 Journal of European Public Policy 
513. For a critical view of frame analysis, see R. A. Payne, ‘Persuasion, Frames and Norm 
Construction’ (2001) 7 European Journal of International Relations 37. 
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others. For instance, the formation of an environmental frame differentiated the EC 
environmental issue-area from market-building issues.  
On the one hand, the frame for governance is viewed in this paper as the shared 
understanding of a code of behaviours, of what situations are problematic and how certain 
issues should be governed. That is, framing builds a coherent system comprising core norms 
substantiating the code, key concepts expressing the situation and regulative principles directing 
the strategy. In detail:  
core norms (i.e. environmental protection as a public interest, environmental regulation 
without disguised protectionism, individual environmental rights or value of nature per se 
etc.);  
key concepts (i.e. value limit, pollution, the market in relation to the environment, 
environment as a whole, biodiversity or ecosystem etc.) and  
regulative principles (i.e. sustainable development, environmental integration, polluter-pay 
or precaution etc.).  
A coherent system comprising these elements can be defined as the frame for governance in a 
specific issue-area.  
On the other hand, frames can be assumed to emerge through discourses. With the 
exchange and accumulation of discourses, a shared frame between Member governments, EU 
institutional actors and societal actors creates a world of common meaning in the environmental 
issue-area. Through this creational process, the common definition of problems and solutions 
concerning this issue-area is established. In this paper, it is assumed that the accumulation of 
discourses enables frames to be created, deepened or transformed and from this standpoint EC 
environmental law must be considered in terms of discourse. In this regard, the role of law is 
taken seriously with reference to the concept of discourse. Law catalyses normative discourses, 
and laws themselves are also normative discourses, as noted in the previous section. Conversely, 
frames are assumed to be prescribed by normative discourses that are contextualised by a 
preceding web of shared meanings. In this way, normative discourses are constitutive of the 
creation and modification of frames.  
What, then, is the institutional arrangement which supports discourses and framing and 
enables them to operate? To tackle this, this paper uses the concept of regime. Regimes are 
understood as an accumulation of institutions enabling the interaction between discourses and 
framing, both in procedural and in substantive terms. As such, regimes are regarded as an arena 
in which norms evolve.  
1.3   Regime 
International Relations have provided many interesting studies based on the concept of 
  10 
regime since the 1970s.
24 Their main target is to grasp the concept of international cooperation 
which is more narrow than an ‘international structure’ and wider than a ‘formal organisation’.
25 
In the same vein as realist interpretations,
26 this regime concept is offered to tackle the question 
of how states are able to constrain their own practices through international agreements despite 
their strong inclinations towards interest and power maximisation. According to Krasner, ‘the 
regime concept . . . has attracted a number of scholars who have been primarily identified with 
the realist tradition’, not the scholars who have invoked ideational transnationalism.
27 
At first sight, it therefore seems odd that this concept is applied to the institutional context 
of the EU. Needless to say, the EU is a highly organised and its interstate politics is regulated by 
a highly federal-like constitutionalised system.
28   While the arguments of liberal 
intergovernmentalism,
29  which stresses the preferences of the big powers in the EU, are 
reasonable, the system of EU interstate politics is not as the same as the system of international 
politics. The former has a high degree convergence of the Member States’ expectations owing to 
the highly legalised and judicialised system. Surely the EU is more than an international 
regime.
30 
However, the classical definition of regime by Krasner can, on account of its ambiguity, 
open a wider perspective. Krasner’s famous definition is as follows: 
‘Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations’.
31 
On this analysis, regimes can be regarded as prescribing international governance in a specific 
issue-area. On the basis of this definition, it is possible to extend the meaning of regimes. First 
of all, the area where there are sets of ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures’ is not necessarily limited within ‘a given area of international relations’, although 
this limitation becomes important when trying to specify a unit of international cooperation 
which is more narrow than an international structure and wider than a formal organisation. It 
                                                 
24   S. Haggard and B. A. Simmons, ‘Theories of International Regimes’ (1987) 41 International 
Organization 491, at 491. 
25   Ibid., at 492. 
26   S. D. Krasner, ‘Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables’ (1982) 
36 International Organization 497, at 497. 
27   Ibid.. 
28   J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an emperor? And other 
essays on European integration (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
29   A.  Moravcsik,  The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Cornell University Press, 1998). 
30   For example, see M. Zürn and D. Wolf, ‘European Law and International Regimes: The Features 
of Law Beyond the Nation State’ (1999) 5 European Law Journal 272. 
31   S. D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ 
(1982) 36 International Organization 185, at 186. 
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can be supposed that all social relations, insofar as they produce a stable order, are reproduced 
with ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures’, which can make ‘actors’ 
expectations converge’. Second, for the reason that organs with organisationally differentiated 
forms – such as legislative, judicial or executive bodies – are not referred to at all in Krasner’s 
definition, it can be claimed that what matters is not the organisational form of organs carrying 
out their individual functions, but the institutional context that makes ‘actors’ expectations 
converge’. Third, it is possible to extend this concept as follows:
32 each regime in its respective 
issue-area can be subsumed within another regime in a wider issue-area; for example, there can 
be the regime A consisting of regime a1, a2, . . an. The EU is a good example. For instance, the 
EC environmental regime consists of a water regime, an air regime, an urban regime, and so on. 
This environmental regime is, however, one of elements of the more comprehensive regime of 
the first pillar in the EU, and this bigger regime, based on the EC Treaty, is subsumed in the 
‘single institutional framework’ (Article 3 TEU) of the EU. 
The concept of regime, as described here, makes it possible to relativise the traditional 
organisational form of governance, i.e. governmental organisation within the modern nation 
state, and to conceptualise the governance structure without having to refer to the form of the 
state. By observing the EU as a kind of regime, and thereby an accumulation of specific 
regimes, the dichotomy between federalist and internationalist approaches can once be set aside. 
All centralised states, federal states and international organisations can be seen as an 
accumulation of individual regimes, which have different scopes of issues. What should be 
examined in terms of regime is therefore not which organisational form has the task of 
governance, but how shared meanings concerning norms emerge: the meanings that are 
systematised as the frame for governance. Attention to the organisational form of governance 
easily leads to a dichotomy within traditional state-centred thinking between a federalised unit 
and intergovernmental cooperation. It should be noted that regardless of whether a regime is 
formed in a federalised arrangement or not, regimes may bring about effective norm-building 
and framing. There may be a state that is inferior to the EC in terms of effective environmental 
governance. 
Further to this and drawing on the concept of framing, regimes can be a coupling point 
between governance and legal studies. On the one hand, since all frames are based on social 
and/or legal norms they may be described as normative in nature. Even purely cognitive frames 
for governance are normative for the reason that framing can take any legal form of agreements 
irrespective of softer and harder forms, which must first be interpreted normatively. On the other 
hand, for the reason that all regimes are formed in a specific issue-area, they can be regarded as 
                                                 
32   This argument may be attributed to a suggestion by Jo Hunt at the research meeting for my MA 
thesis. 
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institutionalising the frame of governance. In other words, regimes emerge along with a bundle 
of agreements aimed towards public problem-solving in a specific issue-area. Therefore, regime 
development must necessarily be seen as being accompanied by norm-building and framing and 
studying regimes means examining what institutional arrangement promotes and supports what 
norm and frame. In this respect, the concept of regime offers the point of convergence between 
governance and legal studies. 
The conceptualisation of regime by Armstrong and Bulmer is instructive for helping to put 
the concept of regime into the research context of this paper. They analyse ‘regime’ from an 
institutionalist perspective and take a politico-legal approach. Building on Krasner’s definition, 
they regard the concept as follows: 
‘Governance regimes each reflect one admixture of rules, procedures and norms 
embedded within the systemic context. Procedurally, each governance regime 
comprises the prevailing admixture of institutions, rules and norms together with the 
relevant policy ‘players’. . . The prevailing admixture varies over time: system-wide 
reforms may have repercussions on the governance regime, such as through the EP 
being granted rights to participate in legislation by co-decision: an overarching norm 
such as subsidiarity may have to be given serious consideration; or court rulings may 
clarify relevant legal bases and policy procedures.’
33 
In their definition, regimes are ‘one admixture of rules, procedures and norms’ in a specific 
issue-area to be governed and individual regimes are embedded into the common ‘systemic 
context’. In other words, regimes are an institutional complex for governance in a specific issue-
area (‘governance regime’ is used in their wording). 
On the other hand, Toope
34 offers a ‘constructivist incarnation’ of the concept of regime. 
Stressing the role of routine dialogue and information-sharing among states, Toope insightfully 
explains a constructivist understanding of regime theory: 
‘Regime theory, especially in its constructivist incarnation, helps to explain how 
binding legal norms may emerge from those patterns of expectation developed through 
the increasing co-ordination of discussions and actions amongst States. Common 
endeavour, even common debate, can give rise to shared meanings which crystallize 
into norms. States participating in such regimes ‘learn’, and the learning affects not only 
their appreciation of self-interest, but may even come to alter the self-perception and 
identification of the State.’
35 
                                                 
33   K. A. Armstrong and S. J. Bulmer, The governance of the Single European Market (Manchester 
University Press, 1998), at 72. 
34   S. J. Toope, ‘Emerging Patterns of Governance and International law’ in M. Byers (ed) The Role 
of Law in International Politics (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
35   Ibid., at 105. 
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According to this understanding, regime formation can be seen as resulting from the process of 
‘shared meanings which crystallize into norms’. To put it another way, it can be said that this 
view emphasises the intersubjectivity in the frame of governance in any issue-area and attempts 
to describe the sharing process of frame in the course of regime development.  
Building on these viewpoints concerning the evolutionary process of norms and frames in 
a specific issue-area, this paper defines the concept of regime as follows. Regimes have two 
dimensions. One is the procedural dimension of arranging who participates in the creation, 
application and interpretation of norms and instruments to govern a specific issue-area. This 
means that regimes enable the stable reproduction of normative discourses. As noted above, law 
catalyses normative discourses and individual laws in themselves are part of these normative 
discourses. The other is the substantive dimension with respect to the policy agenda and the core 
norms that differentiate a specific issue-area from the whole. In this conception, it is through the 
regime that governance materialises as a policy programme encapsulating a coherent system of 
goals, principles and instruments. Regime can, therefore, be understood as institutionalisation of 
the intersubjective frame of governance and according to this conceptualisation, all regimes 
have a shared frame between the actors in a specific issue-area. To put these two dimensions 
together, regimes can be defined to be an accumulation of procedural institutions on the basis of 
specific policy agendas and norms. In other words, regimes procedurally reproduce normative 
discourses, substantively establish a shared frame and thus support the interaction between the 
discourses and the frame. The EU can be understood as consisting of many regimes and 
although all of these regimes have different procedures, they are all ‘embedded within the 
systemic context’
36 as prescribed by the Basic Treaties. 
 
The arguments above have been used to conceive a conceptual framework for considering 
the development in EC environmental law which is as follows. This development can be taken 
to mean norm evolution in the change or deepening of frames of governance in a specific issue-
area; it is the regime that promotes and supports this evolution in procedural and substantive 
terms since in procedural terms the regime reproduces normative discourses around law and of 
laws and establishes, in substantive terms, a policy agenda as a core upon which a shared frame 
is built; accordingly, the regime can be regarded as an arena in which norm evolution takes 
place.  
In terms of ontological premises, this framework may be put into the theoretical context of 
social constructivism
37 in the sense that framing, which sets up common understandings about 
                                                 
36   Armstrong and Bulmer, above n.33, at 72. 
37   For social constructivism in the theoretical context of politico-legal studies, see A.-M. Slaughter, 
A. S. Tulumello and S. Wood, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New 
Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 
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how to view and act in the world, is assumed to constrain, and be also constrained by, 
discourses; conversely, discourses are assumed to be constitutive of framing in that they form 
common meanings via which society is collectively recognised and norms are seen to be shared 
meanings evolving from the interaction between discourses and a frame. In methodological 
terms, this paper claims that a research project based on this conceptual framework can be 
regarded as ‘institutionalist’
38 in the sense that the endogenous institutional dynamics are the 
primary focus and empirical materials are specified according to the EU’s institutional context 
in order to discover how normative discourses are reproduced and how frames are established. 
In the following pages Chapter 2 examines the general features of the EC environmental 
regime, focussing on its formal character, three weaknesses of the regime and the trends towards 
a new governance mode. Chapter 3 traces norm evolution in EC environmental law, giving 
special attention to the normative discourses in the case law of the ECJ, secondary legislation 
and international agreements. 
 
2     EC Environmental Regime 
Building on the conceptual framework offered in Chapter 1, this Chapter takes a general 
view of the features of the EC environmental regime. While the purpose of this overview is, for 
the present, to examine what type of regime exists in the environmental issue-area of the EC, 
the eventual aim is to show the institutional context for environmental norm evolution and the 
role of law itself in this regime. As mentioned in Chapter 1, law catalyses the normative 
discourses which affect, and are affected by, the frame as a coherent system of core norms, key 
concepts and regulative principles in an issue-area. Regimes are an institutional arrangement 
procedurally reproducing normative discourses and substantively establishing a policy agenda 
on the basis of which a frame is formed. Thus, regimes should be considered as an arena in 
which the interaction between normative discourses and a frame for governance occurs, causing 
norms to evolve. 
In this Chapter, two general features of the EC environmental regime are discussed. In 
Section 2.1 the formal institutions of procedure are looked at. In Section 2.2 the weaknesses 
concerning the implementation deficit, the inadmissibility of citizens into the ECJ and the 
parasitic upon market-building policy agenda are looked at. In Section 2.3 it is considered how 
law plays its own role in this regime, in which the new mode of environmental governance has 
been introduced to respond to the ineffectiveness of the command and control approach. An 
                                                                                                                                               
367 and J. Shaw and A. Wiener, ‘The Paradox of the European Polity’ (1999) Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No.10/99 http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/991001.html. 
38   For institutionalism in the context of EU legal and governance studies, see above n.33 and K. A. 
Armstrong, ‘Regulating the free movement of goods: institutions and institutional change’, in J. 
Shaw and G. More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995). 
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overview of this Chapter was follows. 
First, it has been found that EC environmental actions are founded not on political 
commitments not subject to judicial review, but on formal institutions based on the general 
principles of EC law and the decision-making procedures that are set up at a systemic level, i.e. 
the procedural institutions that apply to the individual regimes comprising the EC as a whole. 
Member governments and institutional actors such as the Commission, the Council and the EP 
thus have legal obligations that are reviewed by the ECJ, and financial sanctions are applied for 
non-compliance with the judgments of the ECJ. Further to this, the policy agendas established 
within the environmental regime are so various and comprehensive that it can easily be 
differentiated from other international environmental regimes that deal with a single issue such 
as climate change, ozone depletion, the protection of the Mediterranean Sea and the Rhine and 
so on. Thus, the EC environmental regime seems to be equipped with vertically-arranged 
institutions for the creation, application and enforcement of norms which cover almost all of the 
issue-areas related with the environmental problems. 
Second, despite the high degree of formalisation of the EC environmental regime, it can 
be said that some weak points have been seen in the developmental process of this regime. 
Overall, the following three points can be made: 1) there is an implementation deficit of 
secondary law at the Member State level; 2) it is difficult for societal actors like environmental 
NGOs to bring a case before the ECJ; 3) there is a dependency of environmental legislation on 
other common policy sectors, especially on the building of the common market, in terms of a 
legal base. In other words, the effectiveness of the regime depends on the political will of the 
Member States, which may often attempt to minimise their legal obligations; participation of 
societal actors in the EC judicial process is strictly constrained; until the SEA there was no legal 
base for environmental legislation, and the institutional inertia
39, depending on the legal base of 
other issue-areas, has remained even after the SEA. Certainly, some of these weaknesses have 
been lessened, following pre-SEA developments, post-Maastricht and post-Amsterdam. Each 
reform of the primary law has gradually provided the constitutive foundation for the EC 
environmental regime and has somewhat alleviated these weak points. Nevertheless, the 
weaknesses still remain in one form of another.  
Third, a new mode of EC environmental governance and the likelihood that it will 
stimulate normative discourses and framing is considered. Despite the weak points of the EC 
environmental regime, environmental legal practices have accumulated alongside the reforming 
of primary law and through these practices, the normative discourses surrounding secondary 
laws and case law have grown too. As will be argued in Chapter 3, this type of discourse has 
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undoubtedly enabled a frame for EC environmental governance to be elaborated. This framing, 
based on the growth of the normative discourses, should be taken seriously in a new mode of 
environmental governance highlighting flexible, decentralised, participatory, reflexive and 
deliberative arrangements.
40 This new mode can be interpreted as emphasising the discursive 
power of law which contributes to frame development. 
2.1   Formal Institutions 
A ‘policy in the sphere of the environment’ (Article 3 (l) EC) is formally laid down by the 
institutional arrangement of the EC (that is, ‘the first pillar’ in the EU). EC environmental 
measures and the obligations of Member States are not only prescribed generally by primary law 
(Basic Treaties) and the international conventions, to which the EC is a party, but also 
concretised by secondary laws provided in Article 249 EC as Regulations, Directives and 
Decisions. As will be noted, these laws are not always used as legal instruments giving Member 
States substantive obligations like emission standards or the prohibition of a toxic substance. 
These secondary laws are also enacted for binding Member States in terms of decision-making 
procedures, citizen participation, and information exchange between Member States etc.  
These institutional practices are reviewed by the ECJ, and primary law provides the 
following judicial practices: actions of the Commission against a Member State in Article 226 
EC; actions of a Member State against other Member States in Article 227 EC; imposition of a 
lump sum penalty against Member States for not complying with the judgment of the ECJ in 
Article 228 EC; actions concerning the non-legality of actions of EC institutions and Member 
States in Article 230 para.1 EC; the direct action of individual citizens under Article 230 para.4 
EC; and preliminary references from national courts concerning the interpretation of EC law in 
Article 234 EC.  
Thus, it can be said that the main instruments of the EC environmental regime are hard 
laws which clearly identify the legal obligations of EC institutions and Member States and 
which are open to review by the ECJ. Soft laws, such as the political statements in EAPs, 
Council resolutions, Commission recommendations and the declarations of the European 
Council, are basically supportive. In this sense, the EC environmental regime can be said to be 
founded on highly formal institutions distinguishing the regime from other international regimes 
which depend on informal institutional settings.  
This formal institutionalisation of the environmental regime means that it is embedded 
into the systemic context concerning both the norm-making process in the legislature and the 
enforcement mechanism in the judiciary. As such, the EC environmental regime is, along with 
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other individual regimes comprising the EC as a whole, founded on the general principles of EC 
law and is prescribed in procedural terms. The general principles may be stated as being legal 
certainty, non-discrimination, free movement of goods, freedom of competition, proportionality, 
transparency and fundamental rights.
41  
With regard to the legislative procedure, environmental secondary legislation has two 
patterns. One is the QMV procedure of Article 175 (1) EC based on Article 251 EC, in which 
the EP and the Council take part in the co-decision procedure and which means that the EP can 
reject the common position of the Council. The other is the procedure of Article 175 (2) EC, 
which requires the Council to act unanimously and to only consult with the EP -- this procedure 
applies financial measures, town planning and the choice of energy sources. The co-decision 
procedure is an outcome of the Treaty revision in Amsterdam of 1997. At the time of the SEA, 
environmental measures required the Council to act unanimously, and while the Treaty reform 
in Maastricht enabled the Council to act by the QMV based on Article 252 EC, the influence of 
the EP was constrained to proposing amendments to the common positions of the Council.  
As for the enforcement mechanism, firmly established procedures can be found:
42 the 
administrative phase, in which the Commission attempts to redress the infringements of 
Member States by using Article 226 to send a formal notice letter and by issuing a reasoned 
opinion against the Member State in question; the judicial phase based on the action of the 
Commission against a Member State in Article 226 EC, the action of a Member State in Article 
227 EC when the Commission takes no action and the action of the Commission in Article 228 
EC when it finds non-compliance of a Member State with the judgment of the ECJ. In the 
judicial review process in the EC, the principle of co-operation provided in Article 10 EC has 
often been referred to, in terms of the prevention of conflict between Member States, and 
between national and EC law concerning the matters that Treaties do not have assume in 
advance.
43 Further to these legislative and judicial institutional arrangements, it should be kept 
in mind that the principles established by the ECJ in cases other than those on environmental 
protection can be applied to the environmental regime. The doctrine of direct effect and 
individual rights based on directives are examples of this.
44 
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As the most important instruments for environmental action, secondary laws cover many 
areas of environmental protection. On the one hand, with regard to the comprehensiveness and 
unity, the EC environmental regime should be distinguished from other international 
environmental regimes based on international law, which takes a sector-by-sector approach. 
According to the classification of EUR-Lex on the EU website,
45 the EC environmental regime 
consists of the following constituent regimes: nuclear safety and radioactive waste, water 
protection and management, monitoring of atmospheric pollution, prevention of noise pollution, 
chemicals, industrial risk and biotechnology, management and efficient use of space, the 
environment and natural resources, conservation of wild fauna and flora, and waste 
management and clean technology. On the other hand, there are several measures enabling the 
free access of citizens to environmental information as well as eco-label, eco-audit and eco-
management measures, etc. Moreover, environmental concerns in secondary laws spread to 
issue-areas such as agriculture, social policy related to working conditions and human health, 
transport, regional structural policy, development cooperation and so on. This interpenetration 
of the environmental concerns is based on Article 6 EC, which provides the principle of 
environmental integration. 
In addition, it must also be noted that although this highly formalised regime has been 
established step by step since the SEA through reform of the Basic Treaties, many secondary 
laws and case laws in relation to environmental protection were in existence in the pre-SEA 
days. The EC environmental regime is thus based on an accumulation of these legal practices 
and institutional changes. 
However, the following problems must be noted in the EC environmental regime: 1) there 
are deficits in the implementation of secondary laws on the Member State level; 2) societal 
actors cannot virtually take recourse to the ECJ to demand judicial protection at the EC level; 3) 
environmental secondary legislation parasitises the legal bases of other issue-areas, especially of 
the market building. Although primary legislation has eased the process of overcoming the 
problems of the EC environmental regime, it cannot be said that these problems have 
completely been solved. For instance, the inadmissibility problem continues to be a shortcoming 
of this regime even after Amsterdam. Imagine the following circumstance: the implementation 
of EC environmental legislation is subject to the political will of each Member State, individual 
citizens demanding judicial protection do not have access to the ECJ and environmental norms 
are only legitimised insofar as they support market building. This circumstance represents a 
serious weakness in the regime.  
2.2   Weaknesses 
Weaknesses have been ameliorated not only by change at the level of primary law. As will 
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be argued in Chapter 3, an accumulation of case law and secondary laws as normative 
discourses has also brought about evolving environmental norms in advance of big changes to 
the Treaties and this evolution can be said to contribute to the improvement of the problems of 
the EC environmental regime. While conflicts have taken place around the weaknesses, the 
institutional context of the EC environmental regime has brought about norm evolution, 
especially through judicialised responses to these conflicts, as will be shown in Chapter 3. In the 
following sections, the weaknesses are considered in detail. 
2.2.1  Deficits in Implementation 
In 1998 the Commission submitted a Special Report concerning the implementation of 
water pollution directives.
46 The Report showed examples of current implementation failures of 
the Member States to fulfill their obligations concerning the directives. According to this 
Report, 20 directives concerning water quality have been adopted since 1973.
47 Amongst these, 
the Report paid special attention to the following three directives: Council Directive on urban 
waste water treatment (UWWT Directive),
48 on the protection of waters against pollution caused 
by nitrates from agricultural sources (nitrates Directive)
49   and on the protection of the 
environment, and in particular of the soil, when sewage sludge is used in agriculture.
50  
From this survey, the Report showed ‘numerous instances of non-conformity with, non-
application or incorrect application of the Directives’
51 and listed Greece, Spain, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, France and Finland, particularly as having failed to transpose the 
water-related Directives.
52 Nine in fifteen of the Member States were named! For instance, the 
UWWT Directive has not been transposed by Germany, Greece, Spain and Italy and the nitrates 
Directive has not transposed by Austria and Finland. In addition to this the nitrates Directive 
was not correctly transposed by Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, nor was it 
correctly applied in France.
53  Furthermore, there have been serious nonfulfillments of the 
obligation to provide reports. The Commission has not received the implementation programme 
report prescribed in Article 17 of the UWWT Directive. Needless to say, the negligence in 
reporting means that it is almost impossible for the Commission to assess the progress of this 
policy.
54  
Krämer examines each deficit in implementation in detail.
55 According to him, failures in 
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implementation can be categorised into three types; late or omitted transposition, incomplete or 
incorrect transposition and incorrect application in practice. Among the examples that he lists, 
of particular importance is the nonfulfillment of planning obligations
56  for setting clean-up 
plans, monitoring plans and other related programmes concerning waste, air and water etc. on a 
national level. According to Krämer’s argument, there are conflicts between the national and the 
EC legal order, and the conflicts can be ascribed not only to the differences of legal systems but 
also to the lack of the political will of the Member States sometimes due to a dislike for 
Brussels-made standards.
57  
The consequences of this remark become more serious when the institutional 
arrangements for the implementation of EC law are considered. It is well known that it is 
impossible for EC law to be implemented without the legal and administrative systems of the 
Member States and the primary reason of this can be ascribed to limited administrative 
resources at the EC level. This dependency can be shown in the fact that directives (Article 249 
EC) must be transposed into the legal orders of the Member States and the following statement 
of the ECJ demonstrates the difficulty of ensuring that directives are applied in the manner 
envisaged by EC-law makers:  
‘the Court has held that the implementation of a directive in national law does not necessarily 
require the provisions of the directive to be adopted formally and verbatim in an express 
legislative provision designed for that purpose’.
58 
It is important to note that even regulations (Article 249 EC), which ought to be applied directly 
into national legal orders, must be supported by additional measures of the Member States. 
Krämer says that because there is additional work in giving authorisation and licence, 
undertaking surveillance and monitoring, and doing reporting requirements, ‘. . . the regulations 
are not directly applicable but require Member States to take the necessary steps.’
59 
Thus, the implementation of environmental secondary law depends on the legal and 
administrative systems of the Member States. Serious failures are caused not only by structural 
elements, such as the conflict between the EC and national legal orders, but also by the lack of 
political will on the part of the Member States. How does judicial review operate under these 
circumstances? 
2.2.2   Inaccessibility 
To confront these failures in implementation, the EC legal order has a remarkable 
institution: the judicial review system set up mainly by Article 226, 227, 228, 230 and 234 EC. 
This judicial review system differentiates the legal order of the first pillar of the EU from any 
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other international institution.
60 For instance, Articles 226 and 227 EC give the Commission and 
the Member States competence to take an action in the ECJ against another Member State for 
failing to fulfill the obligations prescribed by EC law. This means that the principle of 
reciprocity seen in the public international legal order is overcome in the EC legal order.
61 
Moreover, Article 228 EC establishes provision for the ECJ to impose a ‘lump sum or penalty 
payment’ on a Member State which ‘fails to take the necessary measures to comply with the 
Court’s judgment’.
62  
However, this judicial system has limits. For instance, Weiler highlights the politicised 
nature of the procedure of Article 226, the limitation of human resources to monitor violations 
and infringements, the inappropriateness of the ECJ procedure in questions of small violations 
and the lack of real enforcement capability.
63  In the context of environmental law, Krämer 
criticises the judicial system as follows: 
‘It is doubtful whether at present the public interest (CHECK: in?) “protection of the 
environment” is sufficiently safeguarded by the judicial system set up under the EC Treaty. 
Indeed, Member States do not make use of their prerogative under Article 170 (now 227 – 
inserted) of the EC Treaty in environmental matters. And the Commission is overburdened with 
the task of both promoting an environmental policy together with Member States and their 
administrative bodies, and at the same time bringing legal actions against Member States and 
their administrative bodies under Article 169 (now 226 – inserted) for failures to comply with 
the policies and rules on the protection of the environment.’
64 
In this regard, Article 230 should be significant since it gives ‘any natural or legal person’ 
the possibility for instituting proceedings before the ECJ. Theoretically, this provision enable 
societal actors, like an environmental NGO, to bring an action against EU institutions before the 
ECJ when they find a nonfulfillment of obligations concerning environmental protection. If the 
Commission, in monitoring the implementation of EC environmental law, can rely on the access 
of societal actors to the ECJ, this should save the Commission work. This provision would also 
enable societal actors to participate in normative discourses at the level of the judiciary.  
However, the admissibility of societal actors to the ECJ has strictly been constrained. This 
is the so-called barrier of Article 230,
65 which places the condition of ‘direct and individual 
concern’ on the locus standi of individuals. In order to have access to the ECJ, individuals or the 
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associations of societal actors have to demonstrate that they have a clear and ‘direct and 
individual concern’ in the case in question. In this respect, the ECJ has interpreted this ‘concern’ 
very strictly and ‘[t]he Court’s case laws have been criticised as unnecessarily restricting the 
access of individuals’.
66 Environmental matters are no exception to this. 
The representative case regarding this strict interpretation is the Greenpeace Case.
67 
Environmental associations -- Greenpeace International et al -- claimed that the construction of 
electrical power stations (in the Canal Islands of Spain) went ahead without an environmental 
impact assessment,
68 despite being founded by a grant from the ERDF (European Regional 
Development Fund). They demanded that the Commission offer more information and suspend 
the construction plans. After a fruitless meeting with the Commission, the associations brought a 
case before the CFI. However, the CFI dismissed this action as inadmissible. The groups then 
brought a suit before the ECJ, appealing against the adjudication of the CFI, and requesting the 
Court to declare the admissibility of the action. One of the issues in this case concerned whether 
or not individuals or societal actors can take an EU institution to the ECJ when a Member State 
that is granted EC financial aid fails to fulfill one of the obligations deriving from EC 
environmental law.  
Greenpeace et al argued for the justification of citizens’ access to the ECJ, referring to 
current developments in environmental legal practices on the national, the EU and international 
levels. They mentioned the widening of citizen’s procedural rights on environmental matters in 
Member States, the development of international environmental law
69 and the development of 
EC environmental law including statements in the 5th EAP.
70  However, the attitude of AG 
Cosmas on individuals’ locus standi was steadfast. If societal actors cannot bring the 
Commission before the ECJ when the Commission has granted financial aid to the Member 
State which subsequently fails to fulfill the obligation of environmental protection, is there any 
avenue for judicial protection? Under these circumstances, nothing can be done except to wait 
for other Member States to begin litigation. However, is there any Member State to monitor the 
failures of another Member States in implementation? Notwithstanding this, AG Cosmas stated 
that: 
‘. . . the fact that legality must be observed per se within the Community, including the 
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Environment; recent judgments of the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; the system of 
administrative review introduced by the World Bank as from 1993 in the case of activities which 
pose a threat to the environment. See, above n.67, para.22. 
70   Ibid. Also see, Opinion of AG Cosmas for the Case, at I-1662, para.27. 
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obligation to protect the environment, does not automatically confer on a natural or legal 
person a right or legal interest enforceable by an action under the fourth paragraph of Article 
173 (now 230 – inserted) of the Treaty. The Community legal order does not recognize an actio 
popularis in environmental matters either. It is not, therefore, possible to rely, as the sole 
ground for claiming locus standi, on the legal vacuum which would be likely to be created by 
the fact that certain infringements by the Commission cannot with certainty be remedied if the 
task of submitting them for judicial review is entrusted exclusively to the Member States and 
the Community institutions, which do not in practice have an interest in that regard.’
71 
Accordingly, Article 234 EC is important. This is a reference procedure called a 
preliminary ruling, by which a national court can ask the ECJ for an interpretation of EC law 
which is in relation to, and may be in conflict with, national law. As such, this procedure opens 
up the opportunity for individual citizens or environmental NGOs to indirectly access the ECJ 
via a national court. This procedure draws upon the doctrine of direct effect, according to which 
EC law gives citizens rights that must be protected when EC law is in conflict with a Member 
State’s law that infringes these rights, or when a Member State fails to fulfill the obligations of 
the secondary laws which give citizens these rights. Because of the linkage between the 
reference procedure and direct effect, individuals or societal actors, like environmental 
associations, may bring a conflict to the ECJ and may rely on the interpretation of the ECJ for 
demanding redress against the infringements of the individual rights granted by EC 
environmental law. For example, in the Greenpeace case above, the Commission suggested the 
use of this preliminary reference procedure to the plaintiff.
72  
Preliminary rulings play a crucial role in ‘the organic connection between the Court of 
Justice and the national courts’.
73 Weiler assesses the significance of the procedure in terms of 
legal order’s characteristics as follows: 
‘The combination of the “constitutionalization” and the system of judicial remedies to a large 
extent nationalized Community obligations and introduced on the Community level the habit 
of obedience and the respect for the rule of law which traditionally is less associated with 
international obligations than national ones.’
74 
As such, this remarkable institution opens up the possibility of the judicialisation of 
environmental conflicts. However, the preliminary reference procedure cannot resolve all the 
problems. It has a decisive limitation: the operation of this procedure depends on a national 
court and the ECJ has no power to judge the invalidity or otherwise of a provision of national 
law. Therefore, the procedure cannot function without the close cooperation of the ECJ and 
                                                 
71   Ibid., at I-1672, para.53. 
72   Ibid., at I-1665, para.34. 
73   Shaw, above n.41, at 29, and for detail explanation, see Chapter 11. 
74   Weiler, above n.60, at 28. 
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national courts.
75  Insofar as the judicial linkage between the EC and the national level is 
concerned, it might be supposed that political intentions have a strong effect on judicial 
processes. The preliminary reference procedure depends on legally non-binding cooperation 
which might be influenced by political uncertainty. This circumstance is similar to that of an 
international regime which expects the compliance of parties without an effective enforcement 
mechanism. Although the parties in the EC’s preliminary reference procedure are national courts, 
and hence stronger compliance can be expected owing to the common spirit of law, the ability 
of societal actors to bring a case against EC institutions before the ECJ should still be viewed as 
important. This strengthens the judicial review system in the EC environmental regime. 
2.2.3   Parasitism on Market 
As mentioned above, EC environmental actions have gained ground in the EC Treaty 
since the SEA. Before the SEA, there was no provision concerning the protection of the 
environment. Even after the SEA, however, the main concern of the EC has undoubtedly been 
the building of ‘One Money and One Market’.
76 Nevertheless, EC environmental legislation has 
been constantly and regularly adopted. There were three EAPs before the SEA,
77 and, according 
to the Commission,
78 there were about 200 secondary laws on environmental measures by the 
beginning of the 5th EAP in 1992. Notwithstanding the circumstances making environmental 
legislation possible, it can be asked whether or not an environmental regime has existed in the 
process of European integration. 
On the one hand, it must be noted that the very existence of environmental actions has 
been justified as supporting measures for creating, and making functional, the common market. 
Member States have, more or less, their own environmental regimes and some adhere to 
international environmental agreements. In addition to this, the obligation to fulfill the principle 
of subsidiarity has added to the difficulties of justifying EC environmental legislation.
79 Under 
these circumstances, EC environmental protection measures found justification as part of the 
                                                 
75   Shaw, above n.41, at 29. 
76   See Armstrong and Bulmer, The Governance of the Single European Act (Manchester University 
Press, 1998), at 205-6. 
77   The first is OJ 1973 C112/3; the second OJ 1977 C139/3; the third OJ 1983 C46/3. 
78   Towards Sustainability, OJ 1993 C138/5, at 11. The Commission looked into the fields covering 
the atmosphere, water, soil, waste, chemicals, biotechnology, product standards, environmental 
impact assessments and protection of nature. However, this survey is obviously arbitrary, 
because it depends on whether legislation for amendments are included, and how widely the 
environment is categorised for the reason that the related fields extend to agriculture, rural 
development, working conditions and so on. Krämer counts only 30 regulations or directives. 
See, L. Krämer, above n.44, at 26. 
79   For example, see Krämer, ibid., at 113. Krämer shows other reasons for the justification. These 
reasons are ‘Communication mechanism’ for the exchange or transfer of expertise knowledge, 
legislative techniques, monitoring methods, administrative techniques and enforcement methods 
between the Member States (at 114), and cohesion obligations described by the Basic Treaties 
that should include ‘environmental cohesion’ (at 115). 
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creation of the common market.  
On the other hand, the question also derives, in part, from the difficulty of defining an 
‘environmental issue-area’. What counts as environmental problems? Even after the EC set up 
its own environmental policy area in Article 174 EC, it was too vague to provide a solid 
definition of the term. For instance, should working conditions be categorised as environmental 
policy or social policy, in terms of the wording ‘protecting human health’ of Article 174(1) EC? 
Should  land uses in relation to fauna and flora issues belong to an environmental, an 
agricultural or a rural developmental policy, in terms of the wording ‘preserving, protecting and 
improving the quality of the environment’ in the same Article? It is impossible to say that there 
has been no arbitrariness in the Commission’s and the Council’s definition of the concept of the 
environment, when the former exercises the initiative for proposals on environmental protection 
measures and the latter decides on the proposals.  
Both the dependency on the objective of building the common market and the arbitrary 
nature of the Commission’s initiatives plus the Council’s decisions concerning environmental 
legislation gave rise to a dispute over the legal base between the Commission, the Council and 
Member States as to whether Article 94 (ex 100) EC for building the common market was 
appropriate for environmental legislation at the pre SEA stage.
80 Post-SEA a debate has arisen 
over whether Article 175 EC (environment), Article 95 EC (internal market) or other related 
Articles (for example, the common commercial policy or the agriculture) should be used.
81 The 
dispute around Article 94 (ex 100) EC at the pre SEA stage has been succeeded by the dispute 
around Article 95 (ex 100a) EC post-SEA, at least until the revision of the Basic Treaties at 
Amsterdam which extended the fields in which the QMV procedure can be used. In the time 
from the SEA to Amsterdam, it seems that the Commission had, in some cases, taken the 
strategic decision of using the QMV procedure in Article 95 EC rather than the unanimity 
procedure of Article 175 EC, in order to make passing environmental legislation easier. This 
strategy has brought about extensive disputes over legal bases for environmental legislation. 
Thus, the very existence of an environmental regime in the EC can in itself be 
problematic. Is the regime independent from, or dependent upon, other regimes? Is it parasitic 
upon the common (and internal) market and other environment-related issue-areas like 
agriculture, transport or social policy, and so on? While effective environmental actions must be 
conditional on firmly established environmental norms, it can be said that the EC began to 
establish norms alongside the building of the common market. As will be argued in detail in 
section 3.1.4, it is the principles of environmental integration which have contributed into the 
transformation of the EC environmental regime from a parasitic regime to a comprehensive 
                                                 
80   For example, see Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy [1980] ECR 1099, at 1105, para.4. 
81   For example, see Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council [1991] ECR I-2867, and Case C-62/88, 
Greece v. Council [1990] I-1527. 
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regime spanning many others. This principles of environmental integration have become 
foundational for the development of an EC environmental regime. 
2.3  New Governance Mode and the Role of Law 
Notwithstanding the implementation deficit, the inadmissibility and the parasitic 
characteristics, the European integration process has accumulated environmental legal practices, 
fragile as they may be. In the process, political statements concerning environmental actions 
have often been issued and many secondary laws and a body of case law have resulted. 
Fundamental modifications of the Basic Treaties have occurred and norms concerning 
environmental protection have been created, shared and elaborated upon. When looking at norm 
evolution, trends in the 1990s to create a new perspective in environmental governance should 
be taken into consideration. 
2.3.1   The Fifth EAP 
The 5th EAP
82 in 1992 offered a change of policy style and declared a departure from a 
command and control approach. This EAP admitted a ‘deficiency of existing strategies’ that 
have the characteristics of ‘too great a reliance on command and control type’ and a 
‘preponderant recourse to Directives’.
83 It announced a shift ‘from top-down to bottom-up’ and 
the adoption of ‘performance targets as non-legal commitments’.
84 These new styles were to be 
reinforced, according to the EAP, through information-oriented policies aiming at a mutual 
learning effect
85 and ‘market-based instruments’.
86 
The 6th EAP
87 in 2001 made concrete the change of style in the 5th EAP. On the basis of 
the new style offered by the latter, the 6th EAP presented the strategies for dealing with climate 
change as an issue-area that is deserving of more attention
88 and reconfirmed the 5th EAP’s 
regulative principles.
89  Therefore, it may be said that despite the ambitious and innovative 
strategies of the 6th EAP, it was undoubtedly the 5th EAP that opened up a new perspective on 
environmental governance. 
While this shift from top-down regulatory instruments to self-regulatory, economic and 
informative instruments certainly makes sense as regards very complicated and difficult 
                                                 
82   Towards Sustainability, OJ 1993 C138/5. 
83   Ibid., at 80. 
84   Ibid., at 12 and 13. 
85   Ibid., at 13. 
86   Ibid., at 16. 
87   2010: Our future Our choice, COM(2001)31 final. 
88   The 6th EAP says in the Explanatory Memorandum that: ‘Many of the conclusions and measures 
proposed in the Fifth Programme remain valid, but they are largely a question of implementation 
on the ground. More persistent and intractable problems, such as climate change, require a more 
concerted effort at Community level to lead the way.’ Ibid., at 67. 
89   Amongst them, it is the principle of environmental integration that is the most strongly stressed. 
The principle is put at the centre of the programme in Article 2 (2) of the Decision of the EP and 
Council concerning the programme. See, ibid., at 71. 
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environmental measures, it may be claimed that the new perspective is vulnerable in terms of 
implementation failures. The introduction of a more horizontal approach may, in practice, be 
mere acceptance of the status quo, in the sense that allowing flexibility for Member States to 
implement EC environmental measures seems to represent acceptance of an already established 
fact. In addition, the emphasis on public awareness and participation via the introduction of 
instruments for information and communication is obviously contradictory to the judicial 
practices that have strictly constrained the access of citizens to the ECJ. Nevertheless, these new 
strategies should be taken seriously when considering the implications of the new mode on 
environmental governance in terms of norm evolution through the interaction between 
normative discourses and framing in a specific issue-area. As will be shown below, the new 
mode has the potential to promote normative discourses more widely even though the 
contradiction between inadmissibility to the ECJ and the participatory perspective of this new 
mode unchallenged. 
2.3.2   New Trends 
For an overview of the new strategies of the 5th EAP the scheme presented by Lenschow 
regarding the mode of governance
90 is instructive. It is comprised of ‘structural elements’ and a 
‘regulatory style’. The former is divided into ‘organisational features’ and ‘state-society 
relations’; the latter features an ‘intervention mode’ and a ‘routine procedure’. Along with this 
governance mode scheme, new strategies can be described, generally speaking, in the following 
way. On the one hand, the organisational features in structural elements change from the vertical 
to the horizontal distribution of responsibilities; state-society relations change from an 
‘authoritarian role of the state’, ‘corporatism’, or ‘competitive pluralism’ to 
‘networks/partnership’. On the other hand, the intervention mode in the regulatory style 
changes from a hierarchical/interventionist to a co-operative style; the routine procedure 
changes from a legalistic to a flexible/pragmatic style and from an adversarial to a consensual 
style.
91 These trends of transformation correspond to ‘the ongoing general as well as policy-
specific (environmental) global discourse on governance’
92 and seem to be embodied in the 5th 
EAP. However, Lenshow points out that, generally speaking, the realisation of this trend of 
transformation is ‘only moderate’
93 and that a mix of old and new features can be recognised. 
Efforts and practices towards the transformation can only be identified within the Commission’s 
Environment DG and the Environment Committee in the European Parliament, in addition to 
which ‘neither the impact of organisational and procedural innovations, nor the shift towards 
                                                 
90   A. Lenschow, ‘Transformation in European Environmental Governance,’ in B. Kohler-Koch and 
R. Eising (eds), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (Routledge, 2000), at 
40. 
91   Ibid., at 40. 
92   Ibid.  
93   Ibid., at 49. 
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new policy instruments, nor the ‘constitutional’ status of new governance elements’
94 is clear. 
Accordingly, this challenge to the mode of environmental governance must be said to remain 
‘policy rhetoric’
95 in official documents. In support of this Lenschow mentions the negative role 
of the ECJ: 
‘. . . the ECJ has contributed to the perpetuation of fragmented governance structures, an 
adversarial rather than consensual patterns of conflict resolution and exclusive network 
structures. . . For instance, by limiting the right of environmental organisations to legally 
pursue non-compliance with EC environmental law (admissibility to the Court is premised on a 
violation of individual rights), and thereby resisting a broad definition of ‘access to justice’, the 
ECJ has prevented the establishment of more open governance structures and practices.’
96 
Scott also offers an explanation of the transformation of the mode of governance.
97 She 
presents ‘five values’ for understanding the new trends: ‘flexibility’, ‘decentralisation’, 
‘participation’, ‘reflexivity’ and ‘deliberation’.
98  Using these five values as measures, she 
reviews the IPPC Directive,
99  which is regarded as an example of a challenge to the new 
perspective. According to Scott, the IPPC Directive certainly presents a requirement to publish 
emission values, an obligation to carry out transboundary consultation, a periodical reporting 
requirement for reflexive modification and other devices for the promotion of mutual learning 
and deliberation and the new perspective represented by the 5th EAP has been put into practice 
by the IPPC Directive, although there is still a mixture of the command and control approach (or 
common standard setting at the EC level) and flexible/decentralised implementation.
100  
However, it should also be noted that the introduction of this perspective does not signify 
a discontinuity with the pre-5th EAP era in terms of institutional arrangements for 
environmental governance. As will be argued in Section 3.2.1, the directive-centred architecture 
of EC environmental law was equipped with a flexible, consensual and information-sharing 
mechanism even before the SEA. 
2.3.3   Role of Law 
As noted above, the EC environmental regime is based upon formal institutions that 
enable judicial review of the legal obligations of EC institutions and Member States. Against 
this picture of the legal dimension of the regime, the governance mode has been altered towards 
a horizontal, networking, cooperative and consensus style. In this contrast between the regime 
and the mode of governance, the role of law should be considered in terms of regime 
                                                 
94   Ibid.  
95   Ibid., at 58. 
96   Ibid., at 49. 
97   Scott, above n.40.  
98   Ibid., at 265-6. 
99   OJ 1996 L257/26. 
100   Scott, above n.40, at 265-272. 
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development, but how can the new mode of governance itself be interpreted from a legal point 
of view? Does the shift from a top-down regulatory instrument to a self-regulatory and 
communicative instrument mean the introduction of a post-legislative approach? Is the role of 
law in the regime denied in the transformation of environmental governance from a vertical or 
hierarchical to a horizontal or consensual instrument? Does the introduction of this new mode 
mean that the EC environmental regime has been de-legalised? 
With these questions in mind, the arguments of Ladeur on EC environmental law 
regarding a new legal order
101 offer an instructive viewpoint. According to him, ‘new types of 
legal phenomenon that cannot be fitted into the notion of the construction of a European legal 
order within a European Federal State’
102   have emerged. This legal phenomenon is 
‘heterarchical’, ‘transnational’, ‘co-operative’ and ‘horizontal’ rather than ‘supranational’ and 
calls into question the traditional close links between the state and law.
103 With respect to this 
phenomenon, a ‘non-traditional legal relationship must be assumed within the EC legal order, 
for the purpose of conceptualising ‘a “network-like” relationship between national, trans- and 
supra-national forms of legal integration in the EU’.
104  This can be called ‘a “third way” 
between the preservation of a national legal order and a relatively homogenous supranational 
order’.
105 A main practice in this ‘third way’ is the legal transplanting of environmental action 
among Member States which stimulates a mutual learning and adaptation process but does not 
lead to the uniformity of administrative law among Member States.
106 Through  studying 
instances of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive
107  and the IPPC Directive,
108 
Ladeur offers the following viewpoint: 
‘Many of the environmental reforms of the EC are not really European, in the sense that they 
have their own systematic framework to which Member States have to adapt. They are rather 
linked to a conception of reciprocal stimulation of change by transplanting new forms of 
environmental regulation from one country to the others. This is inevitable because Europe is 
composed of different legal systems, but there is no European legal system, as such.’
109 
From Ladeur’s study, it can be observed that the new mode of environmental governance is in 
line with ‘a shift from supranational to more transnational co-operative processes of legal 
integration’.
110 
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104   Ibid., at 283. 
105   Ibid..  
106   Ibid., at 293. 
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The following view of Scott should also be considered for the purpose of approaching the 
legal consequences of the new governance mode. This mode brings about two legal practices: 
flexibility in implementation and constraints in procedure.
111   Under EC environmental 
governance, Member States are allowed to implement EC environmental law discretionally, but 
are restricted when it comes to procedures for implementation. By analysing the IPPC 
Directive,
112  she offers a model of ‘(procedurally constrained) flexibility in implementation 
model’.
113 In this model, the constraints of the procedure are interpreted to aim to realise the 
aforementioned ‘participation’, ‘reflexivity’ and ‘deliberation’. This model seems to imply that, 
because of flexibility in implementation, the downstreaming of environmental standards may 
occur; however, because of strong procedural constraints, it can be expected that the 
participatory, reflexive and deliberative procedures will strengthen normative discourses and 
thereby help to develop environmental norms. In other words, proceduralisation can be expected 
to promote normative discourses by the accumulation of which environmental practices may be 
improved. In respect of this proceduralisation, Scott highlights its intrinsic value
114 by stating 
that the procedural intervention of the EC cannot be legitimatised without constitutional 
consideration. It depends on the ECJ whether the intrinsic value of proceduralisation can be 
recognised and concretised in the EC in a participatory, reflexive and deliberative way. In this 
view, the new governance mode for environmental protection is not a mere policy instrument 
aiming at mutual learning and norm-sharing in an issue-area. It also guides discourses on 
environmental governance towards a normative discourse on constitutional values.  
These two concepts -- the shift from a supranational or vertical to a transnational or 
horizontal legal relationship (Ladeur) and the constitutionally prescribed proceduralisation with 
flexibility in implementation (Scott) – are both concerned with the sharing and elaboration of 
environmental norms. If this sharing does not occur in the course of transnationalisation and 
proceduralisation in EC environmental governance, the practices based on these conceptions 
will break down. If the procedure of a horizontal interaction produces no norm, or prompts no 
norm-sharing, the practices become nothing but the means to hide the naked economic interests 
of the common market. In contrast, if the orientation of horizontal mutual learning and the 
reflexive, deliberative practices of the participatory procedure can be based on highly developed 
norms and produce further norm sharing and elaboration, the change of the governance mode 
becomes the means to open a wider sphere of discourses, in which environmental norms may 
further evolve. The widening of the discursive sphere can lead to the development of an 
environmental governance frame which (re-)directs normative discourses and in which all actors 
                                                 
111   Scott, above n.40, at 259-260. 
112   OJ 1996 L257/26. 
113   Scott, above n.40, at 259. 
114   Ibid., at 277-279. 
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must justify their own behaviour. It can be assumed that the more the discursive sphere is 
encouraged through the proceduralisation of the new governance mode, the more interaction 
between normative discourses and a governance frame is activated. 
With respect to the normative implication of this, the role of law must be reconsidered. As 
argued in Chapter 1, law is not only an instrument to set up rules and sanctions and to establish 
the competent relationship between the EC and Member States, it also catalyses normative 
discourses, and laws are simultaneously themselves normative discourses. As Diagram 2 in 
Section 1.1 shows, the former is called the normative discourse around law, and the latter the 
normative discourse of laws, which means that legal texts contain the description of core norms 
supported by key concepts and regulative principles regarding how an issue-area should be 
governed. The two types of normative discourses together (re)create a governance frame, which 
opens a common meaning world that is normative due to the fact that the world is described by 
a normative discourse around law and of laws. From this standpoint, the role of law becomes 
more significant with the introduction of the new mode of environmental governance since law 
enables the new mode of governance to operate effectively in the light of the further evolution 
of norms.  
In addition, the evolution of environmental norms also means the differentiation of the 
environmental regime from other regimes in the EC, especially from the common market 
regime. In other words, this evolution brings about the establishment of environmental norms 
independently of the norms of other regimes. Therefore, it is significant to consider how 
environmental norms have been established and shared in the developmental process of the EC 
environmental regime. 
The EC environmental regime can be characterised in terms of formal institutions and 
weaknesses. In the regime a new mode of governance orientated towards a horizontal, 
networking and consensual style on the basis of the values of decentralisation, flexibility, 
participation, reflexivity and deliberation has been introduced step by step in place of a 
legalistic, hierarchical and top-down regulative approach. Against the contrast between this new 
mode of governance and the highly formalised regime, the role of law must be reconsidered in 
respect to its normative implications; law is not only an instrument to impose obligations, but 
also catalyses normative discourses that have the potential to cause further norm evolution.  
It should be emphasised that the problems of the EC environmental regime concerning the 
implementation deficit and parasitic legislation have brought about conflicts between EC 
institutions, Member States and societal actors, but the highly formalised nature of the regime 
has transformed conflicts into legal disputes which are settled within the judicial system. In 
other words, the EC environmental regime has an institutional arrangement which can transform 
conflicts into the resources for further norm evolution on the basis of previous normative 
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discourses. It must be noted that an accumulation of secondary laws in the EC environmental 
regime has also helped the maturation and evolution of environmental norms through enriching 
the meanings of key concepts in the environmental issue-area, as will be noted. This norm 
evolution based on case law and secondary legislation is the foundation for promoting the 
effective operationalisation of the new mode of governance, whereby the weaknesses of the 
regime can be eradicated. Chapter 3 attempts to describe the process of environmental norm 
evolution that emerges through normative discourses. 
 
3     Environmental Norm Evolution 
Chapter 1 offered a conceptual framework regarding the development of law as norm 
evolution emerging from the interaction between normative discourses and a frame for 
governance.  Regimes were conceptualised as an accumulation of institutions procedurally 
reproducing normative discourses and substantively establishing a policy agenda as the core for 
framing governance in a specific issue-area. In this framework, law was understood both as 
catalysing normative discourses and as a normative discourse itself. Chapter 2 characterised the 
EC environmental regime, focussing on the formal character and the weaknesses of the regime 
and showed that, under the transnationalised and proceduralised mode of EC environmental 
governance, what matters is to examine the role of law in terms of causing norms to evolve. 
Building upon these arguments, this Chapter attempts to describe the evolution of 
environmental norms in the EC environmental regime.  
The focus is on case law, secondary legislation and international environmental 
agreements concluded by the EC as an international actor. Primary legislation, council 
resolutions, EAPs, European Council declaration and presidency conclusions are included as 
background information. This descriptive selection can be explained according to Diagram 2. In 
this institutional context of discourses in the EU, the intermediate discourse of laws (E: 
secondary legislation and international agreements) and the legal discourse of laws (F: case law) 
are focussed on, while other types of discourses are put into the background.  
Diagram 2 
Political Discourse Legal Discourse
Discourse around Law A B C
Discourse of Laws D E F
 
This implies the following understanding in respect to discourses and their contribution to 
norm evolution in the institutional context of the EU. In the continuous gradation from political-
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intensive to legal-intensive discourses in the EU institutional context, the ECJ and the 
legislature have been effective discursive spheres, in terms of supporting norm evolution. The 
case law of the ECJ, as the most legal-intensive discourse, established environmental protection 
as a core norm even before the SEA,  even though there was no visible support from primary 
legislation and the only political discourse around law emerged in the form of EAPs (A in 
Diagram 2). On the basis of environmental norms established in the ECJ, secondary legislation 
(E in Diagram 2) has, as an intermediate discourse between the political and the legal, 
elaborated key concepts that create a governance frame which opens up a common meaning 
world in the environmental issue-area. International environmental agreements have, in addition, 
provided indispensable sources for environmental normative discourses in secondary 
legislation. 
Thus, this Chapter surveys case law, following secondary legislation and international 
environmental agreements, while briefly mentioning other discourses (A, B, C and D in 
Diagram 2) throughout. First, by means of a chronological overview, it explores how the legal 
discourse of the ECJ has established environmental norms as the foundation for further 
evolution, especially highlighting the evolutionary process at the pre SEA stage. Second, the 
question of how further norm evolution has been brought about in secondary legislation is 
examined, with an emphasis on an elaboration of key concepts, which has pushed the 
transformation from a market-supporting to an ecosystem-oriented frame. Third, it is shown that 
the EC environmental regime has internalised international environmental norms, focussing on 
the significance of international agreements based on Article 235 (now 308) pre-SEA, and on 
the Rio process since the 1990s. 
3.1   Case Law of the ECJ 
When attention is placed on courts as a discursive sphere, it should be noted that the 
judicial process cannot be operationalised without conflict. This conflict is manifested as 
disputes over legal norms. Judicial settlement is not merely about the interpretation of 
documents that may, or may not, be used by political actors in pursuit of their own interests. 
Rather, the judicial process of settling conflict is also to be interpreted as offering opportunities 
for norm-sharing or the elaboration of norms. Courts are a discursive sphere for reconfirming 
and refining a governance frame systematising core norms, key concepts and regulative 
principles through conflict.  
3.1.1   Basic Characters 
With regard to legal discourse in the ECJ, three points should be taken into consideration.  
1) The following three actions are dominant in the EC judicial process: a) charges by the 
Commission against a Member State for infringement of an obligation, on the basis of Article 
226 EC; b) disputes between the Commission, the Council, and Member States on the basis of 
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Article 230 EC, with respect to ‘the legality of acts’, ‘an essential procedural requirement’, ‘rule 
of law’ or ‘misuse of powers’; c) preliminary rulings, on the basis of Article 234 EC, by which a 
national court makes a reference to the ECJ, in which the conflict between societal actors, or 
between them and national governments, may be settled according to EC law. From these 
prevailing patterns, legal disputes between plaintiffs, defenders and interveners from EU 
institutions, Member State governments and societal actors are resolved and are thus brought 
into the legal discourse of the ECJ.  
The fact that the above three actions are dominant in environmental cases means that the 
following are very rare or substantively impossible: a dispute between Member States on the 
basis of Article 227 EC
115 and litigation by individuals or associations to bring EU institutions 
before the ECJ on the basis of Article 230 EC. This reveals serious problems in the sphere of 
legal discourses: the indifference of Member States despite their monitoring ability and 
constraints on societal actors despite their willingness to participate in legal discourses in the 
ECJ. Above all, the inadmissibility issue in Article 230 EC can be pointed to as one of the 
essential problems in the EC environmental regime in terms of the democratic potential that 
private (but public interest oriented) actors’ litigation has in causing norms to evolve, as argued 
in Section 2.2.2. Notwithstanding these defects, it should be noted that the three dominant 
patterns have contributed to environmental norm sharing and elaboration, as will be examined 
                                                 
115   Krämer says this ‘has never happened in environmental matters’. L. Krämer, Focus on European 
Environmental Law, Second Edition (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), at 130. As a rare case, Sands 
shows Case 141/78 French Republic v. United Kingdom ([1979] ECR 2923), which concerns 
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prohibiting the use of small-mesh nets, which are particularly harmful to the biological resources 
of the sea. On the basis of Article 227, the French government brought the UK government 
before the ECJ, claiming that the UK had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EC treaty by 
bringing into force the Fishing Nets (North-East Atlantic) Order of 1977 without the pre-
notification and consultation required by the 1976 Council Resolution in the Hague (para.11) 
and Regulation No.101/76 (para.7). The Order was concerned with a matter reserved for the 
competence of the EC. The French government at first brought this matter before the 
Commission, and the latter issued a reasoned opinion claiming that the UK government was in 
breach of the obligations of EC Treaty. On account of the non-compliance of the UK to the 
opinion, the French government brought the former before the ECJ, on the basis of Article 227. 
The ECJ judged that the UK government failed to fulfill the duties of pre-notification and 
consultation with other Member States, referring to the cooperation principle of Article 10 (ex 5) 
EC (paras.8-12). This case shows that Member States are obliged to consult with other Member 
States in advance when applying their own international agreements. What should also be noted 
is that Article 10 EC rejects unilateral actions on the basis of the international agreements of 
individual Member States. Case C-388/95, Belgium v. Spain [2000] ECR I-3123 stands as 
another example of Article 227, but this also is not an environmental case. 
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below. 
2) Environmental legislation in the EC has frequently faced potential or explicit disputes 
over base dispute, as argued in Section 2.2.3. Even after the SEA, which clearly provided the 
legal base for EC environmental legislation, a dispute has been brought before the ECJ, on the 
basis of Article 230 EC, as will be seen below. Generally speaking, for environmental 
legislation in the pre-Amsterdam stage, it was easier to refer to the objective of the building of 
the internal market in Article 95 (ex 100a) EC than to the environmental clause in Article 175 
(ex 130s) EC. The reason for this is because QMV was available in the decision-making 
procedure of the former. In addition, this market-related legislation route was also important for 
the active participation of the EP in the decision-making process.  
However, the conflict around the parasitic nature of environmental concern on the 
building of the common (and internal) market cannot be regarded as a mere struggle over 
competence. It has also become the means by which common meanings on the environment can 
be precisely elaborated and widely shared. The legal discourse surrounding legal base disputes 
in the ECJ has contributed to environmental norm evolution in terms of framing for governance. 
That is, it has stimulated the sharing and elaboration of common meanings regarding 
environmental core norms, key concepts and regulative principles. Above all, this type of 
dispute has promoted the development of the principle of environmental integration, which 
prompts the transformation of an environmental regime from the market-supporting to the 
comprehensive. 
3) The reforms of the EC Treaty in Maastricht provided for a ‘lump sum or penalty 
payment to be paid by the Member States’ in Article 228 EC. Before that, the EC judicial system 
was essentially not an order with a potential sanction, but provided an interpretation without a 
sanction. Sanctions applied because of non-compliance with ECJ judgments were only expected 
in the domestic institutional context of Member States. While the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy certainly make the EC legal order close to a federalised one, they have to be 
buttressed by the voluntary collaboration of national judicial actors through the preliminary 
reference procedure. Insofar as this dependency is concerned, the EC judicial system was still in 
line with the international judicial system before the big reform of 1992. It was dependent upon 
the political will of Member States, and without their legal and administrative system, the 
enforcement of a judgment cannot be secured. The judicialisation of the EC environmental 
regime may be said to have been based to a large degree on the voluntary participation. The 
introduction of a financial penalty has qualitatively changed the character of the ECJ.
116 The 
                                                 
116   Compare Crete II and Case C-75/91, Commission v. Netherlands [1992] ECR I-549, which is a 
case concerning the Netherlands’ breach of obligation due to Article 228 (non-compliance with 
the judgment of the ECJ in Case 236/85) before Maastricht. That is, no financial penalty was 
incurred. 
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first case where the Article 228 sanction was applied is Case 387/97 Commission v. Greece 
(Crete II).
117 Claiming that Greece did not implement the necessary measures to comply with 
the judgment of the ECJ (Case C-45/91), the Commission brought Greece before the ECJ on the 
basis of Article 228. The ECJ ordered Greece to pay a penalty payment of EUR 20000 for each 
day of delay in implementing the measures. In this case, the ECJ aimed to ‘remedy the breach of 
obligations as soon as possible’
118 and the criteria for calculating the amount of payment was 
‘the duration of the infringement, its degree of seriousness and the ability of the Member State 
to pay’.
119  
While this introduction of financial sanction is revolutionary in terms of the character of 
the EC legal order, it must be noted that the evolution of environmental norms had already been 
established long before this big change at the systemic level, as will be argued below. In the first 
place, an interpretation without a sanction does not necessarily lead to the, frequently assumed, 
view that in comparison with a domestic judicial system, international tribunals in general do 
not have any real power. It should be noted that legal discourses in the ECJ becomes a node in 
which each national legal experience is intertwined.
120 Therefore, what matters is how the legal 
discourse promotes the evolutionary process of transnational environmental norms.  
Based on this preliminary understanding, the following is a short chronological survey of 
ECJ case law. The emphasis is mainly on: 1) how far the protection of the environment has been 
regarded as a core norm on the basis of which the ‘environment’ has come to be recognised as 
being general interest and as the grounds for legally protected individual rights; 2) what role the 
principle of environmental integration has played in terms of the development of the EC 
environmental regime. 
3.1.2   Pre-SEA 
At the level of primary law, environmental protection was established as one of EC’s 
objectives following the SEA. Nevertheless, environmentally-oriented legislation had been 
adopted before the SEA. At that time, three EAPs had already been established and provided 
crucial political discourses around law. In the 1st EAP,
121 the legal grounds for environmental 
action were found in the Preamble of the Rome Treaty, the interpretation of Article 2 EC and the 
declaration in the 1972 Paris Summit. However, the first two seem to be too economically-
oriented to establish a particular norm for environmental protection. According to the Preamble, 
the Community must aim at ‘the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of 
their peoples’ and ‘the harmonious development of their economies’.  In Article 2 EC, the 
                                                 
117   Case C-387/97, Commission v. Greece July 4 2000. 
118   Ibid., para.90. 
119   Ibid., para.92. 
120    See, C. Kilpatrick, ‘Community or Communities of Courts in European Integration?: Sex 
Equality Dialogues Between UK Courts and the ECJ’ (1998) 4 ELJ 121. 
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following task was put forth:  
‘to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer 
relations between the States belonging to it’. 
It maybe observed from the above that environmental norms were not foremost in the building 
of the common market. Compared with these, the declaration of the Paris Summit was certainly 
more forthright in advancing the establishment of EC environmental norms. It said that:  
‘economic expansion is not an end in itself . . . As befits the genius of Europe, particular 
attention will be given to intangible values and to protecting the environment so that progress 
may really be put at the service of mankind.’
122  
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that pre-SEA the establishment of an EC environmental regime 
was an obvious objective. It was the legal discourses in the ECJ that largely contributed to the 
activation of environmental normative discourse, supporting and substantiating political 
discourses in the Commission and political leaders. At this point, four pre-SEA cases are 
reviewed. 
Cases 3, 4, 6/76, Cornelis Kramer and others
123 
This Case is based on the preliminary ruling procedure concerning criminal prosecutions 
brought against Dutch fishermen who were accused of breaching the rules of the Netherlands 
for the conservation of fishing resources. The rules issues from the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention, signed at London on 24 January 1959. The contracting parties were all of the 
Member States of the EEC as was, except Italy and Luxembourg, and seven non-member 
countries. The Convention sought the conservation of fish stocks in the North-East Atlantic.
124 
The issues that the Dutch national court referred to the ECJ concerned whether there was a 
competent relation between an international agreement of individual Member States and the 
Community
125   and whether the provisions of the agreement were consistent with the 
Community rules of the common market, especially whether the fishing quotas stipulated in the 
Convention constituted a quantitative restriction in trade between Member States.
126 
Accordingly, this Case was mainly concerned with Community competence regarding 
commitments resulting from international agreements signed by some of the Member States. 
The Case was also concerned with the EC common fisheries policy.  
However, the following statement by the ECJ in its judgment may be seen as a first step 
towards establishing an EC environmental norm: 
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‘In this connexion, the nature and the circumstances of ‘production’ of the product in question, 
fish in the present case, should also be taken into consideration. Measures for the conservation of 
the resources of the sea through fixing catch quotas and limiting the fishing effort, whilst 
restricting ‘production’ in the short term, are aimed precisely at preventing such ‘production’ 
from being marked by a fall which would seriously jeopardize supplies to consumers.’
127 
Despite calls for stabilising the product supply for consumers, this statement may be interpreted 
as implying the idea of sustainable development. In the sense that the quantitative restrictions on 
intracommunity trade were validated on account of the conservation of biological marine 
resources, this Case can be regarded as the one of earliest dealing with environmentally-oriented 
norms and relativising and constraining market-building concerns. 
What should also be noted in this Case is that the Court refers to the principle of 
cooperation in Article 10 (ex 5) EC. The Court says: 
‘Member States participating in the Convention and in other similar agreements are now not 
only under a duty not to enter into any commitment within the framework of those conventions 
which could hinder the Community in carrying out the tasks . . .’
128   
It can be said that this cooperation principle plays a crucial role in structuring normative 




This Case is based on a dispute concerning the jurisdiction of national courts in 
transboundary environmental pollution.
131   The facts are as follows. The undertaking of 
horticulture in the Netherlands was injured by a French mining company’s discharge of 
chlorides into the Rhine and the Dutch brought an action before the Court of Rotterdam (Court 
of First Instance). However, because the Court rejected jurisdiction the Dutch plaintiff lodged an 
appeal with the Gerechtshof in the Hague (Appeal Court), and this Court took up the 
preliminary reference procedure.  
The focal point concerned the interpretation of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The Article in question, 
Article 5(3) of the Convention, states that ‘a person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in 
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another Contracting State, be sued . . . in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the 
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred’.
132 What was in question was whether the 
place meant ‘the place where the damage occurred’ (Erfolgsort) or ‘the place where the event 
having the damage as its sequel occurred’ (Handlungsort).
133  
Interveners were as follows: the French government who argued that jurisdiction should 
be at the court where the act was done; the Dutch government who argued the opposing view; 
and the Commission who argued that it depends on circumstances.  
Written observations lodged with the ECJ made it apparent that two principles were at 
issue: 1) the principle of the rational administration of justice, which was claimed by the French 
government, and 2) compensation for the procedural disadvantage of the injured party in 
transboundary environmental pollution, which was argued by the Dutch government. As the 
Dutch government claimed, there are difficulties in identifying a clear relationship between the 
act and the damage in cases of international environmental pollution. In respect of the 
development of environmental norms, the following remark of the Dutch government is of 
particular interest:  
‘As part of the legal policy to be followed in environmental matters, the injured party should be 
put in a strong position, in particular by placing him in a favourable situation from the point of 
view of procedure’.
134  
The conclusion of the ECJ was that the Brussels Convention enables injured parties to 
bring a suit before courts in both the place where the act was done and the place where the 
damage occurred. This means that plaintiffs have the freedom to select which courts they may 
call upon, that of their country or that of another. The judgment stated that ‘. . . the plaintiff has 
an option to commence proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred or the place 
of the event giving rise to it’.
135 In the Opinion attached with this Case, Advocate General 
(hereinafter: AG) Capotorti examined several Member States’ legal experiences with regard to 
this type of conflict.
136 The examination of the legal systems of Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the UK showed a practice by the EC to seek ‘a systematisation’
137 of 
the legal practices of the Member States. The judgment also stated that: 
‘In these circumstances, the interpretation (giving plaintiffs the freedom to select courts -- 
inserted) . . . has the advantage of avoiding any upheaval in the solutions worked out in the 
various national systems of law, since it looks to unification, in conformity with Article 5(3) of 
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the Convention, by way of a systematisation of solutions which, as to their principle, have 
already been established in most of the States concerned.’
138 
As the Opinion of AG Capotorti acknowledged,
139 the environmental damage where the 
Handlungsort is different from the Erfolgsort is hard to be defined and compensated. This early 
EC environmental case should be remembered because the procedural disadvantage of the 
injured party was problematised through the ECJ’s effort to systematise Member States’ 
experiences. Here the common understanding was established that environmental damages 
should be redressed in a single systematised judicial process and that the procedural 
disadvantage of the injured party should be taken into consideration. 
Case 91/79 Commission v Italy
140  
In this Case, the Italian government challenged the legitimacy of the EC’s competence 
concerning environmental measures and the strict application of Directives by calling into 
question the understanding that Directives should, as a harder law, be differentiated from softer 
international conventions.  
This Case was, on the basis of Article 226 EC, brought before the ECJ by the Commission 
which alleged that the Italian government failed to take the necessary domestic measures 
according to the Detergents Directive.
141 This Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 94 
EC and requires Member States to take measures for restricting the non-biodegradability of 
detergents, with a view to eliminating the technical barriers which impede the functioning of the 
common market. It should be noted that this Directive was adopted during the course of the 1st 
EAP.
142  
The arguments of the Italian government were as follows. First, the objective of the 
Directive had already been achieved by national measures before the Directive entered into 
force. For example, the Italian government claimed that ‘the Italian Law No 125 of 3 March 
1971 provided for a rate of biodegradability of not less than 80%’ (the rate of biodegradability 
given in the Directive is not less than 90%).
143  
Second, the Italian government submitted the draft law before the Senate, although at that 
time the legislative process was suspended by a political crisis.
144 Accordingly, the infringement 
of Italian government was just about the required time-limit during which national measures 
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must be taken. The government claimed that such a delay should never imply a complete refusal 
of the obligations this directive imposes.
145  
Third, Directives in general do not necessarily oblige Member States to adopt laws or 
administrative provisions. What matters is the result to be achieved, as stated in Article 249 
EC.
146 Considering this point together with the first and second, it is clear that there was not 
‘any lack of usual diligence’.
147  
Finally, but most importantly, the Italian government challenged, though only moderately, 
the validity of the EC’s competence concerning environmental measures. Drawing upon the 
obvious fact that the Rome Treaty does not make provisions for the environment, the 
government claimed that Article 94 EC could not be the legal base of the Detergents Directive. 
For this reason, environmental secondary legislation is in the nature of an international 
convention.
148 The wording of the ECJ’s judgement stated that the Italian government ‘feels . . . 
that the subject-matter of the directive lies “at the fringe” of Community powers and that it is 
actually a convention drawn up in the form of a directive.’
149 
Against these arguments of the Italian government, the ECJ established that Directives are 
not an international convention and that environmental measures at the EC level are valid. First, 
according to the ECJ, any decisions adopted within the EC’s institutional framework ‘cannot be 
described as an “international agreement”‘.
150 Therefore, specific national circumstances cannot 
be referred to as valid reasons for an infringement. The comments in the Opinion of AG Mayras 
is interesting, with regard to how to differentiate between international law and EC law. AG 
Mayras interpreted the claim of the Italian government as follows: 
‘. . . the Court is asked to fall into line with the view of the majority of academic writers on 
international law that the assessment of the international liability of a State must take into 
account the factual circumstances which brought about the breach of its obligations.’
151  
Recalling earlier established case law, AG Mayras stressed ‘the specific object of the procedure’ 
the aim of which is ‘to ensure the uniform application of Community law in all Member states’ 
and ‘to give a solid basis to the free movement of goods, the foundation of the Community’.
152 
For this reason, AG Mayras concluded that ‘the taking into account of the circumstances 
explaining factually the reasons existing in a country for its failure are incompatible with the 
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very nature of the procedure’.
153 Moreover, ‘the Member States are obliged to ensure the full 
and exact application of the provisions of any directive’
154 and ‘“Similar” and “identical” are 
not synonymous.’
155  
Second, the validity of EC’s environmental measures was confirmed as an objective of the 
building of the common market. The ECJ confirmed that Article 94 EC is the valid legal base 
for the measures, because:  
‘[p]rovisions which are made necessary by considerations relating to the environment and 
health may be a burden upon the undertakings to which they apply and if there is no 
harmonization of national provisions on the matter, competition may be appreciably 
distorted.’
156 
The ECJ argued that the Detergents Directive is not only in line with the 1st EAP, which the 
Italian government suggested was a fringe issue, but is also in line with the General Programme 
for the elimination of technical barriers to trade (adopted by the Council in 1969).
157  
In the sense that this Case confirmed the hardness of environmental Directives despite the 
fragile legislative context of the pre-SEA milieu, its significance cannot be ignored. According 
to the ECJ, EC environmental law should not be seen from the viewpoint of international law. It 
is not an agreement among sovereign states the implementation of which can, to some degree, 
be flexible subject to domestic legal systems and political circumstances. This judgment was 
also applied in the first financial penalty Case noted above (Crete Case II).
158 Almost a decade 
of delay in the Greek government’s obligatory measures regarding the chaotic dumping of 
military and hospital waste materials into the river Kouroupitos was in part due to public 
opposition to the building of a mechanical recycling and composting plant as well as a landfill 
site in this area. However, the ECJ stated that:  
‘it is settled case-law that a Member State may not plead internal circumstances, such as 
difficulties of implementation which emerge at the stage when a Community measure is put into 
effect, to justify a failure to comply with obligations and time-limits laid down by Community 
law.’
159 
Notwithstanding the proactive attitude in Case 91/79, it must be borne in mind that EC 
action in the sphere of environmental protection was on the whole directed towards the 
elimination of disparities between Member States, disparities which could distort the 
functioning of the common market. In this sense, it has to be said that the environment was at 
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this stage not yet constituted as a value independent from market concerns, although its 
normative basis was established. 
Case 240/83 ADBHU
160  
In contrast to the above, this Case recognised environmental protection as an essential 
objective of the EC which can legitimately restrict the principle of freedom of trade. In the sense 
that the legal discourse of the ECJ had provided this recognition already before environmental 
clauses were established by the SEA, this Case is significant. The focal point was the validity of 
the Waste Oils Directive
161  orientated towards the building of the common market. The 
Directive requires Member States to take necessary measures for the safe collection and 
disposal of waste oils, preferably by recycling. For this purpose, the Directive allows Member 
States to give out to tender the permission to deal with waste oils and to assign zones in which 
the permitted undertakings can do this. Moreover, the permitted undertakings receive indemnity 
‘financed in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle’.
162  
The conflict of this Case emerged in France between a public prosecutor and an 
association for waste oil burners, over the French law which was set up in order to implement 
the Waste Oils Directive. The prosecutor applied to Tribunal de Grande Instance de Créteil 
(Regional Court in France), claiming that the aims and objectives of the association were 
unlawful in terms of French law because the association was involved in the unapproved 
burning or disposal of waste oils. Against the claims of the prosecutor, the association raised, 
before the same French regional court, the question of ‘the validity of the Directive in terms of 
certain fundamental principles of EEC law’.
163  On the basis of the preliminary reference 
procedure, the French court referred to the ECJ with questions about the conformity of the 
Waste Oils Directive with ‘the principles of freedom of trade, free movement of goods and 
freedom of competition, which are established by the EEC Treaty’.
164 The point was raised that, 
while this Directive allows Member States to set up ‘permission’, ‘zones’ and ‘subsidies’ for 
undertakings approved by public authorities, these may infringe the principles of the Treaty. The 
parties that submitted observations were the Commission, who had ‘no doubt that the protection 
of the environment against the risk of pollution constitutes an object of general interest which 
the Community may legitimately pursue’;
165 the Council, who stressed the compatibility of the 
Directive with the principles for the market building practices;
166 the French government, who 
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claimed absolute discretion of Member States concerning the operation of the Directive;
167 the 
German government, who validated the Directive and French law from a technological point of 
views;
168 and the Italian government, who recognised the compatibility, because there were ‘no 
barriers restricting exports of such products to other Member States’.
169 
In an answer to the question, the ECJ offered a view that relativises the principle of 
freedom of trade as follows: 
‘In the first place it should be observed that the principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed 
in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the objectives of general interest 
pursued by the Community provided that the rights in question are not substantively 
impaired.’
170 
According to the ECJ, environmental protection is ‘one of the Community’s essential 
objectives’
171 which can limit the principle of freedom of trade so long as the principles of 
proportionality and non-discrimination are observed.
172 In this legal discourse, environmental 
protection was regarded as a valid ground for the restriction of the free trade principle. 
However, it should be added that the principle of the free and fair competition was preferred 
over the principle of freedom of trade in the building of the common market.
173 Accordingly, 
this Case should not be interpreted as illustrating that environmental values were regarded as 
absolutely relativising, or going beyond, market building concerns. On the contrary, the market 
was still weighed in terms of the principle of free and fair competition.  
Nevertheless, it can be stated that the conflict around environmental measures did affect 
the meaning of the common market. This Case demonstrated that, insofar as the fairness of 
competition is observed, freedom of trade can be restricted in the general interest of the 
environment. In this sense, the Case can be seen as an instance in which the meanings of key 
concepts, such as the market, have been affected by legal discourses on environmental norms. In 
this way, this Case established environmental protection as a core norm that the EC is obliged to 
serve. 
3.1.3  Post-SEA 
The EC environmental measures had a weak foundation before the SEA, but even after the 
establishment of environmental clauses by the SEA, the unanimity procedure was required for 
environmental legislation. Nevertheless, environmental norm-making by the 1985 IGC has in an 
obvious way provided environmental objectives and regulative principles on environmental 
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governance. This pro-environment tendency was also reconfirmed at the 1990/91 IGC, which 
produced the Maastricht Treaty, in which environmental protection was inserted into the 
Preamble of the TEU. Along with the trends encouraging primary environmental legislation, the 
ECJ has offered pro-environmental interpretations. These interpretations can be divided into the 
environmental protection as a general objective, and the individual rights derived from EC 
environmental legislation. 
3.1.3.1  General Objectives 
With regard to the general objectives of environmental governance, two cases can be 
raised. One is the Peralta Case,
174 in which the tension between the principle of freedom to 
provide maritime transport services and restrictions for preventing pollution was problematised. 
In this Case, the ECJ ascertained that Article 174 EC ‘defining the general objectives of the 
Community’
175 can be applied in order to restrict the principle of freedom to provide services, 
although the ECJ did not provide the detailed interpretation of this Article, claiming that the 
responsibility for its realisation was the task of the Council.  
The other Case is Cali v. SEPG
176 which tackled the issue of compatibility between anti-
pollution surveillance granted by a national authority and the elimination of an abuse of power. 
In this Case, the ECJ acknowledged the special character of environmental protection as 
follows: ‘the exercise of powers relating to the protection of the environment . . . are typically 
those of a public authority’,
177 and state practices of environmental protection can therefore 
escape the breach of competition law. 
3.1.3.2   Environmental Rights 
With regard to individual environmental rights, in Case C-131/88,
178 which dealt with the 
infringement by Germany of obligations concerning the Groundwater Directive,
179 the  ECJ 
demonstrated that the Directive does offer individuals environmental rights. The wording of the 
judgment is as follows: 
‘The directive at issue in the present case seeks to protect the Community’s groundwater in an 
effective manner by laying down specific and detailed provisions requiring the Member States 
to adopt a series of prohibitions, authorization schemes and monitoring procedures in order to 
prevent or limit discharges of certain substances. The purpose of those provisions of the 
directive is thus to create rights and obligations for individuals.’
180 
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This interpretation was reconfirmed in Case C-361/88,
181 which dealt with the failure of 
Germany to fulfill its obligations to transpose the Sulphur Dioxide Directive
182 into the national 
legal order. Remarking on how the Directive should be transposed, the ECJ stated: 
‘it (transposition of a directive into domestic law: inserted) does indeed guarantee the full 
application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where the 
directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the 
full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts.’
183 
The ECJ went on: 
‘It (Article 2 of the sulphur dioxide directive -- inserted) implies, therefore, that whenever the 
exceeding of the limit values could endanger human health, the persons concerned must be in a 
position to rely on mandatory rules in order to be able to assert their rights.’
184 
What deserves attention is the fact that the two Directives above, which were interpreted 
as creating environmental rights for individuals in these Cases, were adopted pre-SEA and 
showed that despite the lack of primary legislation for environmental protection, secondary 
legislation supporting the common market was interpreted in a manner so as to create 
environmental rights through ECJ case law. 
3.1.4   The Principle of Environmental Integration 
Notwithstanding the pro-environmental interpretation of the ECJ, the basis of 
environmental legislation was still weak on the following accounts: the unanimity procedure 
required in the environmental clause of Article 175 EC and the strong orientation of Member 
States towards the development of their economies. It can be seen that, even after the SEA, it 
was difficult for the EC to build an environmental governance frame which relativised 
economic-oriented concerns. In this situation, it is the principle of environmental integration 
that contributed to regime development, in terms of creating a frame for environmental 
governance.  
While this principle was, at the primary law level, provided in Article 130r (2) (now 6) EC 
by the SEA, it had already been alluded in the 1st EAP. The wording of the Programme is as 
follows:  
‘Effects on the environment should be taken into account at the earliest possible stage in all 
the technical planning and decision-making processes’.
185  
Although there was no evident wording in the Principles section of the 2nd EAP,
186 the 3rd EAP 
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provided for ‘integration of the environmental dimension into other policies’.
187 However, in the 
4th EAP, which was adopted at the same time as the SEA, the integration principle was again 
elaborated in detail.
188 In Article 130r (2) (now 6) EC, the principle was expressed that:  
‘[e]nvironmental protection requirements shall be a component of the Community’s other 
policies.’  
In the elaboration of the 4th EAP, this principle was regarded as providing a more proactive 
environmental measure than EC primary law, as well as providing a holistic participatory 
approach to environmental issues. The 4th EAP stated that: 
‘all economic and social developments throughout the Community, whether undertaken by 
public or private bodies or of a mixed character, would have environmental requirements built 
fully into their planning and execution’.
189 
While this proactive stance in the 4th EAP did not extend beyond the rhetoric of political 
discourse, the more ambiguous wording in EC primary law has been interpreted by the ECJ as a 
basis for validating the parasitic legislation of environmental measures. The legal discourse in 
the ECJ has enabled EC environmental legislation to be adopted on the legal bases of other 
issue-areas, in particular, on the legal base for the building of the internal market (Article 95 
EC). Moreover, in legal base disputes, the position of the environment as against the market has 
been strengthened through the demarcation of core norms. Two environmental cases are 
discussed below followed by an examination of the post-Amsterdam situation. 
Case C-62/88 Commission v Greece
190  
This Case concerns a reference by the Greek government to the ECJ on the basis of Article 
230 EC regarding a Regulation dealing with the disaster of the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station.
191  This Regulation requires Member States to impose strict limits on imports of 
agricultural products from non-Member States due to the possibility of radioactive 
contamination.  
The Regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 133 EC providing the common 
commercial policy, in which the QMV procedure is available. The Greek government claimed 
that the adoption was an infringement of the Rome Treaty (in this Case, including the EAEC 
Treaty) on account of a non-justifiable legal base and that the Regulation should be based on 
environment-related clauses, for which unanimity is required. The focal point was whether the 
legal base for limiting agricultural trade derived from Treaty Articles on common commercial 
policy or environmental policy.  
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The ECJ recognised that the choice of legal base ‘may influence the content of the 
contested measure’
192 because procedural requirements are different.
193  According to the ECJ, 
the main purpose of the Regulation is ‘to regulate trade between the Community and non-
member countries’,
194 despite the fact that a commercial policy for the trading of agricultural 
products can be implemented to ensure consumer health.
195 In contrast, Article 30 et seq EAEC 
has a main purpose of governing ‘the basic standards for protection of the health of the general 
public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation’.
196  The ECJ’s argument was that, 
although one of the objectives of environmental protection is to set the permitted maximum 
levels of radioactive contamination, this does not necessarily remove the Regulation from the 
sphere of common commercial policy.
197 On the contrary, Articles 174 and 175 EC leave intact 
other provisions of primary law, ‘even if the measures to be taken under the [. . .] provisions 
pursue at the same time any of the objectives of environmental protection’.
198  
In this respect, the principle of environmental integration was referred to, with a view to 
excluding all other provisions with environmental concerns from being based on Article 175 
EC. The ECJ stated that this interpretation:  
‘. . . is confirmed by the second sentence of Article 130r(2) EEC (now Article 6 EC -- inserted), 
. . . that provision, which reflects the principle whereby all Community measures must satisfy 
the requirements of environmental protection, implies that a Community measure cannot be 
part of Community action on environmental matters merely because it takes account of those 
requirements.’
199 
Here the integration principle was referred to in an effort to justify environmental measures, by 
basing them on provisions (in this Case commercial policy), other than environmental clauses. 
Case C-300/89 Commission v Council
200  
This Case is another legal base dispute concerning the programme Directive
201 that 
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derived from the Titanium Dioxide Directive.
202 This programme Directive requires Member 
States to set up programmes for the reduction of waste discharges and to submit reports on these 
programmes to the Commission. The Council adopted this programme Directive on the basis of 
Article 175 EC, despite the fact that the Commission had based its proposal on Article 95 EC. 
The Commission brought an action before the ECJ, asking for the annulment of this Directive.  
Like Case C-62/88 above, the question of the legal base was significant due to the 
procedures which applied to Articles 95 and 175 EC. The former makes QMV and the 
involvement of the EP possible, but the latter requires unanimity and only consultation with the 
EP. At first, the Commission had proposed this Directive on the basis of Article 94 and 308 EC. 
After the SEA entered into force, the Commission amended the base to Article 95 EC and in the 
legislative process, the EP voiced the opinion, on the side of the Commission, that the legal base 
should be Article 95 EC.  
The claim of the Commission was that ‘the directive, although contributing to 
environmental protection, has as its ‘main purpose’ or ‘centre of gravity’ the improvement of 
conditions of competition in the titanium dioxide industry.’
203 Article 1 of the Directive ‘lays 
down procedures for harmonizing the programmes for the reduction and eventual elimination of 
pollution from existing industrial establishments and is intended to improve the conditions of 
competition in the titanium dioxide industry.’ The Directive establishes a harmonised treatment 
of waste, imposes a prohibition of the dumping and injection of waste and lays down maximum 
values for harmful substances from the titanium dioxide industry. The Commission thus argued 
that these measures mainly surround the establishing and functioning of the internal market. The 
Commission said that ‘the requirements of environmental protection form an integral part of the 
harmonizing action to be taken on the basis of Article 100a’
204 (now 95 EC) and that this Article 
‘constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 130s’ (now 175 EC), and the latter is not 
‘intrinsically’ directed towards the attainment of the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.
205  Against these arguments, the Council contended that the centre of gravity 
should be placed in the area of environmental concern.
206  The Court recognised that ‘the 
directive is concerned, indissociably, with both the protection of the environment and the 
elimination of disparities in conditions of competition’
207   and ruled in favour of the 
Commission.  
As one of reasons for the act of annulment, the Court referred to the principle of 
environmental integration provided in Article 6 (ex 130r (2)) EC. According to the ECJ ‘[t]his 
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principle implies that a Community measure cannot be covered by Article 130s (now 175 -- 
inserted) EC merely because it also pursues objectives of environmental protection.’
208 In 
addition, the ECJ stressed Article 95 (3) EC, which requires the Commission to be concerned 
about ‘environmental protection’ and to ‘take as a base a high level of protection’.
209 Thus, 
Article 6 and 95 (3) EC were referred to as the reasons why Article 95 EC (the Commission’s 
position) is also the proper legal base for environmental legislation, along with Article 175 EC 
(the Council’s position).  
This case shows how normative discourses on the market and the environment have 
developed. It is not merely a question of procedural disputes over legal bases, nor is it a mere 
struggle over competence between the EC and the Member States. Disputes about legal bases 
should not be interpreted only from the viewpoint of the Commission’s strategy of legalising 
environmental protection by reference to the internal market and the QMV procedure. Through 
legal base disputes, legal discourses on the normative relationship between the market and the 
environment can be seen as bringing to the fore ideas regarding how the market should be 
embedded in a general social system, in which the environment constitutes a matter of 
significant public interest. 
After Amsterdam 
The Treaty reforms which took place in Amsterdam 1997 should be given special 
attentions because they establish the principle of sustainable development as one of the basic 
objectives of the EU.
210 Henceforward this principle is no longer ancillary to the economic 
principle.
211 On the contrary, it is part of the constitutional values to which the EU has consulted 
itself. In relation to this, Amsterdam provided the principle of environmental integration with 
independent status in Article 6 EC.
212  According to Grimeaud, this has become ‘a general 
principle of EC law as opposed to a principle of EC environmental law alone’.
213 Responding to 
primary legislation, ‘the environmental integration process’
214 began at the Cardiff European 
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Council of June 1998, where the European Council demanded that the Commission and the 
Council create concrete measures for realising this principle.
215  
With regard to the principle of environmental integration after Amsterdam, the following 
two Cases should be noted. the First Corporate Shipping Case
216 and  the  PreussenElektra 
Case.
217 were brought about under this ‘environmental integration process’ directed by political 
discourses in the European Council. In the former, the discretional economic concern of 
Member States was judged as invalid with reference to the designation of ‘special areas of 
conservation’ in the Habitats Directive.
218 In the latter, state aid in favour of renewable energy 
suppliers was validated against EC competition law, although proportionality was stressed. Both 
Cases help to show that environmental protection is an essential concern of the EU. More 
significantly, the Opinion of the Advocate General, in both Cases,
219  pointed out the pro-
environmental tendency of the Amsterdam Treaty and highlighted the significance of Article 6 
EC which is orientated towards the principle of sustainable development.
220 The  Opinion 
attached to the PreussenElektra Case states that, ‘in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development’. . . ‘Article 6 is not merely programmatic; it imposes legal 
obligations’, and suggests that the EC has to fight against threats to ‘the ecosystem as a 
whole’.
221 In the First Corporate Shipping Case, AG Léger regards the principle of sustainable 
development as ‘a fundamental concept of environmental law’, referring to the 1987 Brundtland 
Report, and he emphasised the principle of environmental integration in terms of realising the 
principle of sustainable development.
222  
During the process of this legal discourse, environmental protection no longer remained a 
mere ancillary norm for the support of market building and it now constitutes its own norm that 
is independent from market concerns. Fair market competition and environmental protection are 
independent norms that should be balanced against one another as obligations of the EC. 
However, it must also be said that in these two Cases, there was no significant change from 
previous legal discourses. On the contrary, it has been a gradual process that has changed the 
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status of environmental regime from a parasite regime to an independent regime. These two 
Cases place previous legal discourses into the new normative context, which is elaborated in 
Article 6 EC. 
3.2   Secondary Legislation 
This section attempts to outline norm evolution in EC environmental legislation by 
examining the policy sectors of pollution prevention in industrial activities and nature 
conservation in developmental activities. The emphasis is mainly on norm evolution post-SEA 
and the examination reveals further evolution in environmental norms against a backdrop of an 
accumulation of interpretative practices through legal discourses.  
As argued above, this focus implies that secondary legislation has, as the intermediate 
discourse of laws (E in Diagram 2), not only a legal, but also a political discursive character in 
the sense that it includes a hortatory and general policy goal oriented statement against which it 
is difficult to clearly identify a legal obligation. This dimension of intermediate discourses is apt 
to become both environmentally proactive and ambitious. As such, secondary legislation 
enables political discourses to be put into a legal discursive context and simultaneously has the 
potential to transform preceding discursive contexts that have gradually been formed through 
legal discourses. Thus, the corpus of this intermediate discourse of laws can be expected to help 
provide a preceding governance frame with renewed key concepts and regulative principles on 
the basis of judicially reviewable core norms. In other words, the text of laws as a normative 
discourse determines, to a large degree, how to frame governance in a specific issue-area. 
3.2.1   Basic Architecture of Directives 
As noted above, despite the lack of clear environmental clauses in the EC Treaty, 
environmental legislation has accumulated since the 1st EAP in 1972. This has been mainly on 
the basis of Article 94 EC, other environment-related Articles (such as common commercial or 
agricultural policy clauses) and Article 308 EC. The former two give the EC powers with regard 
to the building of the common market and Article 308 EC prescribes an implied, or general 
legislative, power to attain the objectives of the Treaty.
223   However, due to primary 
environmental legislation provided by the 1985 IGC, the main legal base for environmental 
secondary legislation has been shifted from these Articles on the market building and implied 
powers, to environmental Articles – (174, 175, 176 EC), although legislation based on market 
concerns have still been used due to institutional inertia.
224 
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Needless to say, this major change in primary law is crucial in the sense that it has created 
environmental basic laws as a normative foundation for secondary legislation. Basic regulative 
environmental principles – such as the prevention of pollution at source, environmental 
integration and the polluter-pay principle – which had already been prescribed in the 1st EAP
225 
were also incorporated into the text of the EC Treaty. These principles are elaborated potentially 
not only through political discourses but also through legal discourses. Notwithstanding this 
major change at the primary law level, it should be noted that the basic characteristics of EC 
environmental governance have not changed fundamentally since the years prior to the SEA and 
even after Amsterdam, insofar as the basic architecture regarding obligatory arrangements 
against Member States is concerned.
226 The directive-centred architecture can be summed up in 
the four points:  
1)  A framework setting for guiding national level measures by providing the ambiguous 
concepts of limit values and environmental quality standards
227 or of priority natural 
habitat types, priority species and special areas of conservation.
228 This framework 
enables Member States to derogate from some of their obligations.  
2) An  annex-model
229 for the flexible adaptation to technological progress, as well as for 
the gradual adoption of stricter substantive obligations;  
3)  A system of environmental information sharing through reporting requirements about 
management plans, programmes and monitoring of Member States, and through the 
                                                                                                                                               
emissions from agricultural or forestry tractors); concerning Article 133 EC (common 
commercial policy), see Regulation (EEC) No.3925/87 OJ 1987 L371/14 (the conditions of 
imports of agricultural products from third countries influenced by the accident at the 
Chernobyl); concerning Article 80(2) EC (transport policy), see Directive 93/75/EEC OJ 1993 
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institutionalist account of this institutional inertia, see K. A. Armstrong and S. J. Bulmer, The 
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theory and by what we have called international ecosystem law’ (at 57). 
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intermediation of the Commission;
230  
4)  Institutional arrangements to promote cooperation among Member States, and between 
the Commission and Member States through transboundary consultation and through a 
technical Committee comprised of the Commission and Member States.
231  
Insofar as these four points are concerned, no change can be found in the architecture, despite 
reforms of primary law. 
Nevertheless, post-SEA important differences have emerged in terms of precise key 
concepts based on core norms. The legislative process, in which political and legal discourses 
intersect, is the developmental process of a collective recognition regarding problems and norms 
in a specific issue-area. Precisely speaking, this process includes: the establishment of a core 
norm that should be shared for problem-solving or problem-finding, setting up a key concept 
that defines and explains policy-objects to be governed, and the provision of a regulative 
principle that should guide the choice of policy instruments or strategies. As such, the legislative 
process itself also means the developing and reforming of a governance frame in a specific 
issue-area. Thus, legislation as the intermediate discourse of laws can be seen to (re)create a 
world of common meanings consisting of key concepts, core norms and regulative principles. 
3.2.2  Elaboration of Key Concepts 
Legislation provides key concepts with legal definitions. The latter enables the former to 
become constitutive factors of a governance frame, which creates a world of common meanings 
in a specific issue-area. In the EC environmental regime, animals, lands and forest are no longer 
mere economic resources for economic development, or economic goods traded at market, but 
are the invaluable basis of biological diversity that should be protected by public authorities.
232 
Air, water and soil are seen as interconnected and are as such recognised as issues requiring an 
integrated approach for limiting new and existing installations.
233 An  ecosystem-oriented 
definition is imposed on the Community’s water world
234 and sustainable development is more 
precisely defined in terms of this ecosystem orientation.
235  
When tracing out the evolutionary formation of a common meaning world in an 
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environmental issue-area, the following key concepts may serve as good examples. In the 2000 
Integrated Water Framework Directive, pollution is legally defined as:  
‘the direct or indirect introduction, as a result of human activity, of substances or heat into the 
air, water or land which may be harmful to human health or the quality of aquatic ecosystems or 
terrestrial ecosystems directly depending on aquatic ecosystems, which result in damage to 
material property, or which impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the 
environment.’
236 
While the 1996 IPPC Directive uses wording such as ‘the quality of the environment’
237, the 
Integrated Water Framework Directive replaces this wording with ‘the quality of aquatic 
ecosystems or terrestrial ecosystems directly depending on aquatic ecosystems’, thus 
establishing the definition of pollution more precisely.  
The ecosystem has become defined in detail by legislation during the 1990s. The 
following definition of ecosystem is given by the Convention on Biological Diversity (of which 
the EC is a party):  
it ‘means a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-
living environment interacting as a functional unit’.
238  
The world in this definition is now the object of obligatory protection by public authorities.  
In relation to this ecosystem orientation, the 2000 Integrated Water Framework Directive 
has created a single EU water world which consists of interconnected areas of surface water, 
groundwater, inland water, river, lake, transitional water, artificial water and so on.
239 The focal 
point in this constitution of water as a whole is the ‘international river basin district’.
240 This 
Directive aims at promoting transboundary environmental actions on the basis of this 
conception. Water in the EU is no longer the sum total of the areas of water in Member States. 
Instead, the single water world of the EU now exists in discourses on environmental norms.  
This integrated approach has clearly been demonstrated in the IPPC Directive.
241 In this 
Directive, air, water and soil are no longer different medias. On the contrary, they comprise a 
whole that should be addressed holistically in all sectors of industrial activities (i.e. energy, 
metal production or processing, mineral industries, chemical industries, waste management, and 
others).
242  
In the Habitats Directive, ‘a coherent European ecological network of special areas of 
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conservation’ has been planned under the title of Nature 2000.
243  The natural habitats that 
should be protected in particular are:  
‘terrestrial or aquatic areas distinguished by geographic, abiotic and biotic features, whether 
entirely natural or semi-natural’.
244  
This Directive assumes that the EU’s natural environment is a whole undistorted by national 
borders. In this way, the concept of environment, originally a mere constraint on the common 
market, has now been given richer meaning and has been defined as a common heritage that the 
EC and Member States are obliged to protect. 
Furthermore, the 2000 Regulation on developmental policy
245 aims at concretising Article 
6 EC which provides basic regulative principles. This Regulation attempts to realise these 
principles in cooperation with developing countries so that, for instance, financial aid is given 
on the basis of the principle of sustainable development. The strategies of realising this principle 
are based on the principle of environmental integration. The two principles of sustainable 
development and environmental integration can no longer be seen as policy rhetoric or an 
excuse to enact environmental legislation on other issue-areas. This Regulation is based on 
Article 175 EC (environment) and 179 EC (development cooperation) and these principles can, 
therefore, be said to link EC environmental measures at international level with financial aids in 
EC policies on development cooperation.  
Most important is that in Article 2 of the Regulation, sustainable development is defined 
as a legal principle. According to this Article:  
‘“sustainable development” means the improvement of the standard of living and welfare of the 
relevant populations within the limits of the capacity of the ecosystems by maintaining natural 
assets and their biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations.’
246  
In this definition there is no suggestion that economic growth and environmental protection 
should be balanced. Needless to say, issues such as ‘the standard of living and welfare of the 
relevant populations’ do not necessarily entail an economic orientation. Representing a 
reinterpretation of the familiar dichotomy between the economy and the environment, this 
definition is a step towards a legal discourse ‘limits’, ‘ecosystems’, ‘natural assets’, ‘biological 
diversity’ and ‘the benefit of present and future generations’. A focal point is how the discourse 
on these topics can, as a legal discourse, creates normative contexts in which not only EU 
                                                 
243   The Habitats Directive (OJ 1992 L206/7), at Article 3(1). 
244   Ibid., at Article 1(b). 
245   OJ 2000 L288/1.This Regulation follows the 1997 Regulation on environmental measures in 
developing countries in the context of sustainable development (OJ 1997L108/1) that expired on 
31st December 1999, and provides financial aid of 93 million euro for developing countries from 
2000 to 2006. 
246   Ibid., at Article 2. This definition can also be found in the Tropical Forests Regulation (OJ 2000 
L288/6). 
  57 
institutions but also Member States governments are restrained. In legislation, regulative 
principles and key concepts, which are based on core norms, create a common meaning world 
and set up coherent strategies that should be shared among participants of the EC environmental 
regime. 
3.2.3  Ecosystem Orientation 
The development and elaboration process can be summerised as a trend towards a holistic 
and ecosystem-oriented frame.
247  This trend can be paraphrased as moving from market-
oriented values to the intrinsic values of ecosystems per se. This frame change was impossible 
without the evolution of a common meaning world consisting of the environmental norms, 
concepts and regulative principles noted above. The accumulation of legal definitions of 
‘pollution’, ‘international river basin’, ‘biological diversity’, ‘habitats’, ‘sustainable 
development’ and so on, can be argued to bring about a new collective understanding of the 
ecosystem-oriented arrangement of rights/obligations.  
In this regard, the argument of Brunnée and Toope is insightful. Transborder 
environmental degradation brings about a potential and/or a real conflict between states. 
International cooperation on environmental protection can thus be recognised as an attempt to 
remove the causes of potential conflict and to maintain security. Brunnée and Toope apply the 
non-military sense of the concept ‘security’ to international environmental issues.
248 
Environmental issues are a kind of security problem. The prevention of potential conflicts 
between states may undoubtedly be said to be one of the main functions of the EC 
environmental regime. However, Brunnée and Toope also propose ‘an expansive understanding 
of environmental security with particular emphasis on protection of the environment itself’.
249 
According to them, focussing on potential inter-state conflict ‘may detract from the goal of 
security’
250 because such an understanding often changes transboundary environmental issues 
into ‘matters of purely national concern’.
251  They call for the expansion of the concept 
‘environmental security’ into population security in the sense that environmental degradation is 
not only a security problem in interstate conflict, but is also a problem for the quality of life of 
inhabitants. Accordingly, international environmental governance does not only contribute to the 
prevention of the interstate conflict, but also concerns the internal affairs of each state. Thus, 
Brunnée and Toope state that: ‘concern for the environment per se and the interests of people 
might push states towards more cooperative strategies.’
252 This means a re-focussing of interest 
from the allocation of resources to the preservation of ecosystem integrity. Their following 
                                                 
247   Brunnée and Toope, above n.229, at 41-2. 
248   Ibid., at 26-7. 
249   Ibid., at 27. 
250   Ibid. 
251   Ibid. 
252   Ibid. 
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remarks are crucial for assessing the development of the EC environmental regime: 
‘Through the promotion of various environmental regimes, the goal is to move the normative 
evolution along a path from preoccupation with the allocation of resources toward ecosystem 
integrity, without ignoring the continuing power of states to shape the ultimate elaboration of 
international legal regimes. Therefore, in speaking of ecosystem orientation, we wish to 
highlight the need to reorient international law. It must move from a perception that 
environmental degradation is legally relevant only where sovereign interests of states are 
affected, toward a framework that also evaluates state conduct according to ecological criteria. 
It is in this sense, then, that we have called for the development of an “international ecosystem 
law”.’
253 
From this view of international ecosystem law, therefore, the EC environmental regime 
may be said to have a great potential. Although (or because) there are admittedly serious 
problems, like the implementation deficit
254 and insufficient compatibility between 
environmental measures and development activities such as those financed by the ERDF,
255 the 
environmental governance frame has evolved in the way of orientating towards ecosystem 
integrity. The argument of Brunnée and Toope makes sense in the light of the EC’s current 
environmental regime. What should be borne in mind here is that the elaboration of a common 
meaning world (that is, the deepening of framing) has proceeded through the intermediate 
discourse of laws, on the basis of the legal discourse in the ECJ. This emerging frame can be 
expected to promote more environmentally-proactive normative discourses, alleviating the 
weaknesses of this regime. 
3.3  International Agreements 
International environmental agreements should be noted for their role in norm evolution in 
EC environmental law. During the pre SEA stage, international environmental norms had been 
incorporated into the EC legal order on the basis of Article 235 EC (now 308 EC) and were an 
indispensable foundation of norm evolution.
256  After the Treaty reform in Maastricht, while 
                                                 
253   Ibid., at 27-8. 
254   See Section 2.2.1. And also see Krämer, above n.115, at 7-19. 
255   See Greenpeace Case noted in Section 2.2.2. And also see J. Scott, ‘Shared responsibility and 
the Community’s Structural Funds: a legal perspective,’ in U. Collier et al (eds) Subsidiarity and 
Shared Responsibility: New Challenges for EU Environmental Policy (Nomos, 1997). 
256   The instances of this Article 235 international environmental agreements are: the Convention for 
the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution and the Protocol for the prevention of 
the pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by dumping from ships and aircraft (OJ 1977 L240/1); 
the Convention for the protection of the Rhine against chemical pollution and an Additional 
Agreement to the Agreement, signed in Berne on 29 April 1963, concerning the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (OJ 1977 L240/35); the 
Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild animals (OJ 1982 L210/10); the 
Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats (OJ 1982 L38/1); the 
Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution (OJ 1982 L171/11); the Protocol for the 
protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution from land-based sources (OJ1983 L67/1); 
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international agreements have been adopted on the basis of Article 174(4) EC , it is the Rio 
process-related international instruments (Agenda 21, Biodiversity, Climate Change and so on) 
that made a decisive impact on the development of the EC environmental regime. 
3.3.1  Article 235 International Agreements 
An example of Article 235 international agreements is the 1982 International Convention 
on Migratory Wild Animals which expresses ‘the ever-growing value of migratory wild animals 
from environmental, ecological, genetic, scientific, aesthetic, recreational, cultural, educational, 
social and economic points of view’, and states that States ‘must be the protectors of the 
migratory species of wild animals that live within or pass through their national jurisdictional 
boundaries’.
257  In addition, the 1982 European Wildlife and Natural Habitats Convention 
provides a baseline for protecting wildlife habitats that have their own value and whose 
protection should be obligation of the States. The Preamble states that ‘wild flora and fauna 
constitute a natural heritage of aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational, economic and intrinsic 
value that needs to be preserved and handed on to future generations’.
258  
This Wildlife Convention’s architecture for governance is similar to the EC environmental 
Directives in terms of planning requirements,
259  reporting  requirements,
260  a  standing 
committee
261 and so on. The cognitive frame and norms expressed by the Convention can be 
seen to contribute to the creation of legally prescribed natural habitats in the EU and provide a 
bridge between the 1979 Wild Birds Directive and the 1992 Habitats Directive in the discourse 
on European natural habitats. For the reason that nature conservation is far from market 
concerns, these Article 235 conventions should be noted as being a significant driving force 
behind environmental norm evolution on the pre-SEA stage. 
3.3.2  The Rio Process 
As part of the remarkable environmental trends outside the EU during the 1990s, the 
UNCED in Rio of 1992 should be taken seriously. At Rio, the Rio Declaration
262 and Agenda 
21
263 were produced and important environmental conventions
264 – the Climate Convention, the 
                                                                                                                                               
the Agreement for cooperation in dealing with pollution of the North Sea by oil and other 
harmful substances (OJ L188/7). 
257    The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species  of Wild  Animals (OJ 1982 
L210/11), at Preamble. 
258    The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (OJ 1982 
L38/1), at Preamble. 
259   Ibid., at Article 3 and 4. 
260   Ibid., at Article 9(2). 
261   Ibid., at Article 13. 
262   See The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development: The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, http://www.infohabitat.org/agenda21, [accessed Sept. 2000].  
263   See The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Agenda 21, http: // 
www. infohabitat. org / agenda21, [accessed Sept. 2000]. 
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Convention on Biological Diversity and Forest Principles – were adopted. The EC committed 
itself as one unit to this international environmental process.
265 While there have been many 
actions following Rio, not only at the U.N. level but also at the European level, the Rio process 
must be said to have substantially influenced the EC environmental regime. Undoubtedly, the 
control and preservation of climate, biological diversity and forests have become since Rio 
fundamental objectives of EC environmental governance. Endorsed by a Council Resolution 
and a Common Position,
 266 Agenda 21 has, as an historical action programme, has given the EC 
environmental regime primary impetus for norm evolution and the main concern of the 5th EAP 
was how to put these international commitments into practice.  
Moreover, the 27 principles of the Rio Declaration
267  have founded the regulative 
principles of the EC environmental regime. What is remarkable in the context of this Chapter is: 
1) sustainable development in Principle 1, which says:  
‘Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a 
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature;’  
2) environmentally integrated policies in Principle 4, which says:  
‘In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an 
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.’  
The former is fundamental for the latter in terms of normative implications and after Rio, 
concern for the environment has been orientated towards human poverty and equality. The idea 
that these two concerns should be related to each other
268 is not unknown. However, it is the Rio 
Declaration and Agenda 21 that have decisively raised the awareness that the two should be, and 
are, considered as inseparable. In Rio, the inseparability between the environment and the 
poverty/equality was expressed as the principle of sustainable development, which now seems 
to have become more than simply buzzword.  
The EC environmental regime is no exception to this trend of sustainable development, as 
                                                 
265   See Council Resolution, OJ 1993 C138/1. This resolution says: ‘Whereas the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) meeting in Rio de Janeiro, 3 to 14 June 
1992, adopted the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 which are aimed at achieving sustainable 
patterns of development worldwide as well as a declaration of forest principles; whereas 
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266   Ibid. See also the Council Common Position on 17 April 1997, OJ 1997 C 157/12. 
267   The Rio Declaration, above n.262.  
268   See the 1972 United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Principle 1 
of this declaration said that ‘Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, 
and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations’. See J. Alder and D. Wilkinson, Environmental Law and Ethics (Macmillan, 
1999), at 112. 
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argued above when discussing the First Corporate Shipping Case, the PreussenElektra Case, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 2000 Regulation on developmental policy. In 
addition to these, the process of realising the Kyoto Protocol
269  and forestry protection 
strategies
270  should be stressed in terms of proactive environmental discourses within the 
institutional context of the EC environmental regime. The principle of sustainable development 
as a fundamental regulative principle will continue to be important for legal and political 
environmental discourses in the EC environmental regime.  
 
With a view to tracing norm evolution in the EC environmental regime, this Chapter has 
considered the following: 1) the laying down of norm evolution in legal discourses in the ECJ, 
mainly with regard to the pre-SEA stage; 2) the further evolution of norms in intermediate 
discourses of secondary laws, emphasising the ecosystem-oriented elaboration of key concepts 
after the SEA; 3) international environmental agreements concluded by the EC that have 
supported and promoted discourses in secondary legislation, highlighting both the Article 235 
international agreements pre-SEA and the Rio process since the 1990s. This tracing of norm 
evolution was carried out against the background of the development of other types of 
discourses, such as primary law, EAPs and others which were discussed throughout each 
section. 
In sum, this Chapter has argued that the attempt to describe norm evolution offers an 
overall picture of a process which has been circumscribed by the legal discourse of ECJ case 
law (F in Diagram 2), and which has been developed through the intermediate discourse of 
secondary law (E in Diagram 2) and subsequently supported by international agreements. It 
appears that the relatively politically-intensive policy-goal setting and judicially unreviewable 
forms of discourses which are a part of primary legislation, EAPs, and others, is grounded on, 
and is transferred into, relatively legally-intensive discursive spheres (the legislature and, as the 
most legally intensive, the ECJ). This viewpoint has been reached by placing environmental 
case law and legislation into a conceptual framework which highlights the fundamental role of 
discourses in governance frames. Legal and political discourses on environmental norms have 
been seen to bring about the differentiation of the environmental regime from other regimes, or 
more precisely, the development from a regime parasitic on market concerns to an emerging 
ecosystem-oriented regime. 
The limitations of legal discourses in an environmental issue-area is that the legal 
definition of, for example, limit value or good water status, easily leads to the conclusion that 
only minimum standards need to be achieved. Therefore, legal discourses should be 
                                                 
269   See Partnership for integration, COM (98) 333. 
270   See Council Resolution on a forestry strategy for the European Union, OJ 1999 C 56/1. 
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supplemented with political discourses that strongly encourage the commitments beyond legal 
obligations. A political discourse could claim that even if legal obligations lay down a standard 
of X, the Community norm is to surpass X. However, political discourses have the difficulty 
that they cannot be pinned down to legal obligations and they cannot be reviewed in Court. In 
political discourse, decision-makers can say something that sounds good but is without 
commitment in order to strengthen their popular support.  
Thus, the accumulation of discourses surrounding case law and secondary legislation must 
be taken seriously. Regime development, through which normative discourses are promoted, 
simultaneously causes the deepening of a governance frame that systematises core norms, key 
concepts and regulative principles. In the EC environmental regime, the constructed frame of 
common understanding has been realised by case law as the legal discourse of laws and  has 
been developed further by legislation, as the intermediate discourse of laws. These types of 
discourses have also structured other types of discourses, such as the political discourse around 
law and the legal discourse around law. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper is summarised as follows. It first offered a conceptual framework which 




Discourse Norm Evolution Framing
(procedural terms) (substantive terms)
Regime
Here the development of law was understood as norm evolution, which is caused with 
normative discourses, and which creates, redirects or makes more precise a frame to govern a 
specific issue-area.  
Normative discourses were understood to be catalysed by the creation, application and 
interpretation of norms. The texts of individual laws were also in themselves regarded as 
normative discourses. The former is the normative discourse around law and the latter is the 
normative discourse of laws. This normative discourse was further divided into the political and 
the legal, in terms of susceptibility to judicial review. Further to this, a median area was 
assumed between the political and the legal. Thus, six categories of normative discourses were 
offered, as shown in Diagram 2 below:  
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Diagram 2 
Political Discourse Legal Discourse
Discourse around Law A B C
Discourse of Laws D E F
 
As Chapter 3 argued, this paper focussed on F (the legal discourse of laws) and E (the 
intermediate discourse of laws) for the reason that EC environmental law can be interpreted as 
developed through F and E, during the period of no legal base in the Basic Treaties. Framing 
was regarded as building, in a specific issue-area, a coherent system of core norms 
substantiating the behavioural code, key concepts expressing the problematic situation and 
regulative principles showing the strategy of problem-solving. This governance frame was seen 
to form the discursive context and was simultaneously thought of as having developed through 
discourses. Regimes were seen to be an accumulation of institutions conceptualised as stably 
reproducing normative discourses in procedural terms and as establishing in substantive terms a 
policy agenda, on the basis of which framing takes place. As such, regimes were understood to 
be an arena in which norm evolution occurs. This paper described the development of EC 
environmental law according to this conceptual framework. It can be said that this framework 
also explains how law matters. In short, law brings about norm evolution that (re)creates a 
governance frame. To put this in theoretical terms, the accumulation of discourses brings about, 
and simultaneously is affected by, intersubjective meanings which constitutes the social world. 
Building on this conceptual framework, Chapter 2 examined the general features of the EC 
environmental regime. In procedural terms the regime is based on formal institutions established 
by primary and secondary legislation, the general principles of which are commonly applied to 
other regimes in the EC. That is, it is not political agreements but legal provisions susceptible to 
judicial review that constitute the procedural setting. In particular, a centralised interpretation of 
norms by the ECJ has established the foundations for environmental norm evolution. In 
substantive terms, the EC environmental regime had no clearly recognised environmental policy 
agenda in the EC Treaty and was orientated towards the common market until the SEA. For 
harmonising conditions of competition in the common market, the command and control 
approach for standardising environmental regulations among Member States was the main 
approach until the 5th EAP.  
Against the EC environmental regime described above, three weaknesses were examined: 
deficits in implementation at the national level; the limitations of societal actors’ access to the 
ECJ; and the parasitic nature of environment legislation on market concerns. Under these 
circumstances, a new governance mode has been pursued since the 5th EAP. Its main aim is to 
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minimise the uniform approach based on legal instruments and to strengthen the procedural 
constraints concerning participation and information exchange. Under this horizontal and 
consensual approach, Chapter 2 pointed out that normative discourses come to matter more in 
the light of norm evolution under proceduralisation; the role of law should be focused on in 
terms of normative discourses, which constitutes a frame governing a specific issue-area. 
With regard to this frame, Chapter 3 showed the generative process of EC environmental 
norms, examining the following:  
1) the establishment of environmental norms through case laws pre-SEA, post-SEA, 
and after Amsterdam;  
2) the emergence of a holistic and ecosystem-oriented frame in secondary legislation, 
drawing on the Habitats Directive, the IPPC Directive, the Integrated Water Framework 
Directive, the Developmental Policy Regulation for the principle of environmental 
integration and so on;  
3) the role of international agreements to which the EC is a party, briefly reviewing the 
Article 235 international agreements pre-SEA and the Rio process in the 1990s. 
Building on the conceptual framework Chapter 1 offered, this generative process was shown as 
norm evolution in EC environmental law that can be described as proceeding from market-
oriented values to ecosystem-oriented values.  
The fact that this evolution has happened mainly through the accumulation of the legal 
discourse of laws (F in Diagram 2) and the intermediate discourse of laws (E in Diagram 2) 
shows the endemic nature of institutional practices in the EC environmental regime. In other 
words, what plays a primary role for framing, thereby opening up a world of common meaning 
in the environmental issue-area, is not the political discourse around law and of laws, but rather 
the legal and the intermediate discourse of laws. It is the institutional arrangement of the EC 
environmental regime that enables this discursive dynamic. This regime provides EC law with 
an institutional context in which law can further the evolution of norms.  
Thus, this paper has approached the question of how law matters. However, what must 
also be explained is why norm evolution has not taken place more extensively and what 
likelihood is the sound evolution of environmental norms being distorted structurally? In this 
respect, more research must be conducted. However, the conceptual framework of this paper 
may have the potential for application to research projects studying a role of law with respect to 
norm evolution and governance frames in a specific issue-area. 
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